Efficiency, Equity, and Optimal Income Taxation

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Abstract

Social insurance schemes must resolve a trade-off between competing efficiency and equity considerations. Yet there are few general statements of this trade-off that could be used for practical policymaking. To this end, this paper re-assesses optimal income tax policy in the influential Mirrlees (1971) model. It provides an intuitive characterisation of the optimum, based on two newly-defined cost terms that are directly interpretable as the marginal costs of inefficiency and of inequality respectively. These terms allow for a simple description of optimal policy under a generalised utilitarian social welfare criterion, even when preferences exhibit income effects. They can also be used to state the weaker requirements of Pareto efficiency in the model. An empirical section then shows how the analysis can be applied to ask how well the balance is struck in practice between competing efficiency and equity concerns. Based on earnings, consumption and tax data from 2008, our results suggest that social insurance policy in the US is systematically giving insufficient weight to equity considerations. This is particularly true when assessing the marginal tax rates paid on low-to-middle income ranges. Consistent with a ‘median voter interpretation’, we show that the observed tax system can only be rationalised by a set of Pareto weights that places disproportionate emphasis on the welfare of those in the middle of the earnings distribution.

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1 Introduction

It has long been argued that social insurance schemes must resolve a trade-off between ‘efficiency’ and ‘equity’. Policy intervention is generally needed if substantial variation in welfare is to be avoided across members of the same society, but the greater the degree of intervention the more likely it is that productive behaviour will be discouraged.\(^1\) This trade-off is central to income tax policy, where the key issue is whether the distortionary impact of raising taxes offsets the benefits of having more resources to redistribute. A natural question one might ask, therefore, is whether real-world tax systems do a good job in managing these competing concerns.

An important framework for analysing this question is the model of optimal income taxation devised by Mirrlees (1971), in which the efficiency-equity trade-off derives more specifically from an informational asymmetry. Individuals are assumed to differ in their underlying productivity levels, but productivity itself cannot be observed – only income. The government is concerned to see an even distribution of consumption across the population, but must always ensure that more able agents are given sufficient incentives to produce more output.

This model is notoriously complex, and a number of equivalent analytical characterisations of its optimum are possible. By far the most influential has been that of Saez (2001), who provided a solution in terms of a limited number of interpretable, and potentially estimable, objects – notably compensated and uncompensated labour supply elasticities, the empirical earnings distribution, and social preferences. In improving the accessibility of the Mirrlees model, this work provided a key foundation for a large applied literature.\(^2\)

Yet Saez’s characterisation is far more tractable in the special case that preferences are quasi-linear in consumption, so that Hicksian and Marshallian elasticities coincide. Its complexity increases by an order of magnitude under more general preferences. This has biased the applied literature that analyses practical policy towards an assumption of no income effects, even though this is inconsistent with the twin empirical regularities of balanced growth and an absence of any trend in labour hours by income.\(^3\) It would be useful instead to be able to describe optimal tax policy in a simple fashion irrespective of the character of preferences. The present paper does just this. We provide a novel, intuitive set of restrictions that an optimal allocation must satisfy in the Mirrlees setting. This characterisation has the added advantage of being a direct statement of the

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\(^1\) A form of this argument can be traced at least to Smith’s *Wealth of Nations* (Book V, Ch 2), where four maxims for a desirable tax system are presented. The first captures a contemporary notion of equity: “The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities.”

The fourth maxim, meanwhile, captured the need to minimise productive losses from tax distortions: “Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the state.” The other two maxims related to the timing of taxation and the predictability of one’s liabilities – issues that have subsequently faded in importance.

\(^2\) See in particular the recent survey by Piketty and Saez (2013). Mirrlees (2011) is the clearest example of the lessons from this literature being directly incorporated into the policy debate.

\(^3\) See, for instance, Piketty et al. (2013) for a recent application of the framework without income effects. If agents differ only in their ability to produce output with a given quantity of labour supply, quasi-linear preferences generally imply that hours worked should be increasing in productivity. There is little empirical support for such a regularity.
equity-efficiency trade-off: its key equation is a requirement that the marginal cost of introducing productive inefficiencies through the tax system should equal the marginal benefits of reducing inequality by doing so.\textsuperscript{4} The aim in presenting this formulation is to give a new dimension to the applied policy debate. It allows observed social insurance systems to be assessed simply and directly in terms of the efficiency-equity balance that they are striking.

Specifically, our approach is to define and motivate two new cost terms that correspond to the marginal costs (a) of providing utility to agents, and (b) of inducing productive inefficiency through the tax system. We show that an optimum can then be described by a set of necessary relationships among these two terms, together with the exogenous distribution of productivity types and derivatives of the social welfare function. Based on this characterisation we are able to define a model-consistent class of inequality measures against which to judge a tax system, based on the consumption-output allocation that it induces. These measures capture how well the tax system is addressing inequality far better than marginal tax rates, which are the commonly invoked measure of ‘progressivity’.

Naturally it is very unlikely that the efficiency-equity trade-off will be perfectly struck by any real-world tax system. But one of the advantages of our analysis is that it can indicate the manner in which there is a departure from optimality at different points in observed earnings distributions – of the form: ‘Insufficient concern given to efficiency for medium earners’, for instance. It also allows for a direct comparison across different earnings levels of the marginal benefits from improving the trade-off. This seems particularly useful for applied policy purposes, as it can show precisely what sorts of tax reforms would yield the greatest benefits.

Our characterisation results are likely to be of significant use for applied work, but they also inform important theoretical questions. In particular, we show a close link between our new optimality condition and the requirements of Pareto efficient income taxation in the static Mirrlees model – an issue recently considered by Werning (2007). We show how our two cost terms can be used to infer a set of restrictions that are necessary for a tax system to be Pareto efficient, and that must therefore be satisfied by any optimal scheme devised by a social planner whose objective criterion is strictly increasing in the utility levels of all agents. In this regard we generalise Werning’s earlier results, which obtained only for a simplified version of the model. If an allocation is Pareto efficient then it follows that it must be optimal for a given set of Pareto weights, and we show generically how these weights can be recovered for a given allocation.

Perhaps most significantly, we show as part of this analysis that it is generally Pareto inefficient for marginal income tax rates to jump downwards by discrete amounts as income grows. Such jumps are common features of means-tested benefit schemes that see the absolute value of benefits withdrawn as incomes grow above some threshold level – examples being the Earned Income Tax Credit in the United States and Working Tax Credit in the United Kingdom. They also appear when an upper threshold is placed on the income range for which social insurance contributions are withdrawn.

\textsuperscript{4}Inequality is undesirable to a (generalised) utilitarian policymaker to the extent that it implies the cost of providing a unit of utility to poor individuals is lower than to rich individuals. A first-best utilitarian allocation would equalise this cost across the population.
made, or if the marginal contribution rate to these schemes falls discretely in income. The Pareto inefficiency of these ‘regressive kinks’ suggests that they should be uncontroversial candidates for reform.

Following the theoretical results, an applied section then provides an illustrative attempt to quantify the way efficiency-equity trade-offs are managed in practice. Using data from the PSID survey we estimate a distribution of individual-level productivities consistent with observed cross-sectional income and consumption patterns for the US economy in 2008. This distribution satisfies the requirement that each agent’s observed consumption-output choices in the dataset must be optimal given (a) the marginal tax rate that they are estimated to have faced, and (b) an assumed, parametric form for the utility function. Given this type distribution, for the same utility structure we can then infer the marginal benefits to changing the income tax schedule at different points, and in particular to changing the way in which efficiency and equity considerations are balanced against one another.

The main qualitative result of this exercise is that the US tax system appears systematically to introduce too few productive distortions relative to the degree of inequality that it leaves in place. Put differently, equity concerns are under-valued relative to the Mirrleesian optimum. This result is surprisingly general: it is true at all points along the income distribution for a benchmark calibration of constant-elasticity preferences over consumption and leisure, and a social objective that admits moderate diminishing marginal social welfare returns as individuals’ resources are increased.\(^5\) Quantitatively, we find that the greatest gains would follow from reducing the post-tax income gap between low-to-middle income earners and more productive types. Fixing an income level around the 25th percentile of the earnings distribution and changing taxes so as to reduce the relative post-tax incomes of all higher-earning agents by around seven dollars – redistributing the proceeds to keep social welfare constant – could generate a resource surplus of up to a dollar per taxpayer.

Moreover, the direction of the bias ascribed to observed policy is only partially reversed when there are no diminishing marginal social welfare returns to providing individuals with resources, in the sense that the individual utility function is homogeneous of degree one in consumption and leisure, and the policymaker is utilitarian. In this case we still find that more productive distortions would be beneficial across the lower two quartiles of the income distribution, because of an enduring difference in the relative cost of providing welfare to low earners. This is despite the absence of any ‘intrinsic’ incentive to redistribute through strict curvature in the social, or individual, welfare function.

Finally, our analysis considers the Pareto efficiency of the observed tax system. We show that there is no clear violation of the Pareto criterion beyond the ‘regressive kinks’ mentioned above. But the pattern of Pareto weights that is needed in order for observed taxes to be optimal is far from uniform across the income distribution. Interestingly, policy appears to be placing disproportionately

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\(^5\)To be clear, these diminishing returns are treated as arising from curvature in a Bergsen-Samuelson social welfare function, aggregating underlying utility functions that are homogeneous of degree one in consumption and leisure.
high weight on the welfare of agents in the middle of the income distribution, with relatively low weight in the extremes. A possible exception to this rule is that very high earners may receive relatively favourable treatment, but this conclusion is quite sensitive to the empirical strategy used, for reasons explained below. Overall this would be consistent with a model of political economy in which politicians court the support both of the median voter and – potentially – of the very rich.

Some of these results are clearly contentious. But to the extent that they have limitations, these are largely shared with all papers that use the static Mirrleesian framework to answer applied questions about optimal income taxes. Since this model remains central to ongoing debates about the appropriate top rate of tax in particular, it seems of interest to use it to assess tax policy more broadly – and in particular to interrogate existing tax structures.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic form of the static Mirrlees problem that we study. Section 3 presents our main characterisation result when a specific, generalised utilitarian welfare criterion is applied, and relates it to a weaker set of restrictions that follow simply from the Pareto criterion. We provide a brief discussion linking our analytical approach to the ‘primal’ method familiar from Ramsey tax theory. Section 4 provides intuition for the general result by applying it to the well-known isoelastic, separable preference structure, deriving novel results for the top rate of income tax in this case. Section 5 contains our main empirical exercise, testing the efficiency-equity balance struck by the US tax system. Section 6 concludes.

2 Model setup

2.1 Preferences and technology

We use a variant of the model set out in Mirrlees (1971). The economy is populated by a continuum of individuals indexed by their productivity type $\theta \in \Theta \subset \mathbb{R}$. The type set $\Theta$ is closed and has a finite lower bound denoted $\underline{\theta}$, but is possibly unbounded above: $\Theta = [\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$ or $\Theta = [\underline{\theta}, \infty)$. Agents derive utility from consumption and disutility from production, in a manner that depends on $\theta$. Their utility function is denoted $u : \mathbb{R}_+^2 \times \Theta \to \mathbb{R}$, where $u$ is assumed to be $C^2$ in all three of its arguments (respectively consumption, output and type). Demand for both consumption and leisure is assumed to be normal, where leisure can be understood as the negative of output. Types are assumed to be private information to individuals, with only output publicly observable; this will provide the government with a non-trivial screening problem in selecting among possible allocations.

To impose structure on the problem we endow $u$ with the usual single crossing property:

Assumption 1 For any distinct pair of allocations $(c', y')$ and $(c'', y'')$ such that $(c', y') < (c'', y'')$ (in the product order sense) and $\theta' < \theta''$, if $u(c'', y''; \theta') \geq u(c'y'; \theta')$ then $u(c'', y''; \theta'') >$
Geometrically this condition is implied by the fact that indifference curves in consumption-output space are ‘flattening’ in $\theta$, in the sense:

$$\frac{d}{d\theta} \left( \frac{u_y(c, y; \theta)}{u_c(c, y; \theta)} \right) < 0$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

Single crossing is an important restriction: it will provide justification for the common practice in the mechanism design literature of relaxing the constraint set implied by incentive compatibility when determining a constrained-optimal allocation. In the appendix we show that it is implied if all individuals share common preferences over consumption and labour supply, with labour supply then being converted into output in a manner that in turn depends on $\theta$. Preference homogeneity of this form remains fairly contentious in the literature – criticised, for instance, by Diamond and Saez (2011) for being too strong a restriction. But at this stage it is an indispensible simplification for deriving our main results.

2.2 Government problem

2.2.1 Objective

We define an allocation as a pair of functions $c: \Theta \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ and $y: \Theta \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ specifying consumption and output levels for each type in $\Theta$. The government’s problem will be to choose from a set of possible allocations in order to maximise a generalised social welfare function, $W$, defined on the utility levels that obtain for the chosen allocation:

$$W := \int_{\theta \in \Theta} G(u(\theta), \theta) f(\theta) d\theta$$

where $f(\theta)$ is the density of types at $\theta$ and we use $u(\theta)$ as shorthand for $u(c(\theta), y(\theta); \theta)$. $G(u, \theta)$ is assumed to be weakly increasing in $u$ for all $\theta$. This general formulation nests three important possibilities:

1. Utilitarianism: $G(u(\theta), \theta) = u(\theta)$.

2. Symmetric inequality aversion: $G(u(\theta), \theta) = g(u(\theta))$, for some concave, increasing function $g: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$

3. Pareto weights: $G(u(\theta), \theta) = \alpha(\theta) u(\theta)$ for some $\alpha: \Theta \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{++}$.

Most presentations of the model use the second of these, following the original treatment by Mirrlees (1971). Utilitarianism is a simpler approach to take, but is often avoided because it undermines any redistributive motive when agents’ preferences are restricted to be quasi-linear in consumption – a case that Diamond (1998) showed to be particularly tractable. Werning (2007) considers the case in which Pareto efficiency is the sole consideration used to assess tax schedules.
In general an allocation $A$ Pareto-dominates an alternative allocation $B$ if and only if $W$ is (weakly) higher under $A$ than $B$ for all admissible choices of the function $G$. Any restrictions on the optimal tax schedule implied by Pareto efficiency alone are thus robust to the controversial question of the appropriate welfare metric – at least within the class of metrics that satisfy the Pareto criterion. This makes them of interest as a potential means for generating ‘consensus’ reforms. We will highlight one such reform in Section 3.3 below, which follows from generalising Werning’s results.

Notice that the objective $W$ is ‘welfarist’ in the traditional sense used in the social choice literature: it maximises a known function of individual-level utilities alone. A recent critique of this approach by Mankiw and Weinzierl (2010) and Weinzierl (2012) has claimed that it does not account for observed policy decisions – notably the absence of ‘tagging’ that would allow tax liabilities to vary on the basis of observable characteristics, such as height, that correlate with individuals’ earnings potentials. Saez and Stantcheva (2013) seek to accommodate this critique by allowing the marginal social value of providing income to a given individual itself to be endogenous to the tax system chosen – on the grounds that certain forms of redistribution might be seen as rewarding the ‘deserving’ more than others.\footnote{This marginal value takes a central role in optimality statements for tax rates derived under the dual approach. See Piketty and Saez (2013) for a general discussion and presentation of these formulae.} To keep the problem simple this generalisation is not admitted here, but it may be useful in future to explore its incorporation into the characterisation that we set out.

### 2.2.2 Constraints

The government seeks to maximise $W$ subject to two (sets of) constraints, which together will define the set of incentive-feasible allocations. The first is a restriction on resources:

$$\int_{\theta \in \Theta} [c(\theta) - y(\theta)] f(\theta) \, d\theta \leq -R$$

where $R$ is an exogenous revenue requirement on the part of the government. An allocation that satisfies (2) will be called feasible.

The second requirement is a restriction on incentive compatibility. Since the government can only observe output, not types, it will have to satisfy the restriction that no agent can obtain strictly higher utility by mimicking another at the chosen allocation. The setting is one in which the revelation principle is well known to hold, and so we lose no generality by focusing exclusively on direct revelation mechanisms. If $(c(\sigma), y(\sigma))$ is the allocation of an agent who reports $\sigma \in \Theta$, incentive compatibility then requires that truthful reporting should be optimal:

$$u(c(\theta), y(\theta); \theta) \geq u(c(\sigma), y(\sigma); \theta) \quad \forall (\theta, \sigma) \in \Theta^2$$

A feasible allocation that satisfies (3) is incentive feasible. The policymaker’s problem is to maximise $W$ on the set of incentive-feasible allocations. An allocation that solves this problem is called a constrained-optimal allocation.
Condition (3) provides a continuum of constraints at each point in \( \Theta \). Such high dimensionality is unmanageable by direct means, and so we instead exploit the single crossing condition to re-cast the constrained choice problem using a technique familiar from the optimal contracting literature.\(^8\) We prove the following in the appendix:

**Proposition 1** An allocation is incentive feasible if and only if (a) the schedules \( c(\theta) \) and \( y(\theta) \) are weakly increasing in \( \theta \), and (b) it satisfies:

\[
\frac{d}{d\theta} [u(c(\theta), y(\theta); \theta)] = \frac{\partial}{\partial \theta} [u(c(\sigma), y(\sigma); \theta)] |_{\sigma = \theta} \tag{4}
\]

where the derivatives here are replaced by their right- and left-hand variants at \( \theta \) and \( \bar{\theta} \) respectively.

This envelope condition is a common feature in screening models. It accounts for the ‘information rents’ that higher types are able to enjoy as a consequence of their privileged informational position. As an agent’s true productivity is increased at the margin, any incentive-compatible scheme must provide enough extra utility under truthful reporting to compensate the agent for the additional welfare he or she can now obtain at a given report. Milgrom and Segal (2002) demonstrate the general applicability of the integrated version of this condition:

\[
u'(\theta') = u(\theta) + \int_\theta^{\theta'} u_\theta(\theta') d\theta \tag{5}
\]

In what follows we will work with condition (5) in place of (3). By Proposition 1 a feasible allocation that satisfies (5) and is increasing must be incentive feasible. But increasingness will prove easier to check ex post, after finding the best feasible allocation in the set that satisfies (5) alone. Thus we will study the relaxed problem of maximising \( W \) subject to (2) and (5) alone. A feasible allocation that satisfies (5) we call relaxed incentive feasible; this allocation is (fully) incentive feasible if it is, additionally, increasing. An allocation that maximises \( W \) on the set of relaxed incentive-feasible allocations is constrained-optimal for the relaxed problem. Likewise, this allocation will be (fully) constrained optimal if it is increasing. If it is not increasing, we can only infer that the value of \( W \) obtained by it is weakly greater than the constrained-optimal value.

Unfortunately there remain no sufficiently general ‘primitive’ conditions under which the solution to the relaxed problem is known to be increasing.\(^9\) But checking the increasingness constraint ex post is not too challenging an imposition. In addition, if one wishes to analyse the potential benefits from small reforms to existing tax systems then there is little cost to doing so under the first-order approach. This is because optimal behaviour by agents in response to a decentralised tax system must always imply an allocation that is weakly increasing in type, given the single crossing condition. Small (differential) perturbations to this allocation must then correspond to movements within the set of incentive-feasible allocations – that is, alternative allocations that

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8See, for instance, Bolton and Dewatripont, Chapter 2.

9If utility is quasi-linear in consumption and the distribution of types has a monotone hazard rate then increasingness is guaranteed; but the assumption of quasi-linearity is too restrictive, as argued in the introduction.
could be supported by an appropriate reform of the tax system – provided they preserve relaxed incentive-feasibility and increasingness. The latter will, moreover, be guaranteed for small enough perturbations provided the original allocation is strictly increasing.

2.2.3 Equivalent representations

An useful feature of this framework is that the constraint set of the problem relies only on the ordinal properties of the utility function. In particular, we could always replace the general incentive compatibility restriction (3) with the following:

\[ V(u(c(\theta), y(\theta)); \theta) \geq V(u(c(\sigma), y(\sigma)); \sigma) \quad \forall (\theta, \sigma) \in \Theta^2 \] (6)

for any monotonically increasing function \( V : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R} \). If we define the resulting utility function \( v := V(u(\cdot)) \) it is clear that this \( v \) inherits the basic structure of \( u \), notably single crossing. The constrained-optimal allocation for the problem of maximising \( W \) on the set of incentive-compatible allocations must therefore be identical to the constrained-optimal allocation for the problem of maximising \( \tilde{W} \) on the set of allocations that satisfy (6) and the resource constraint (2), where \( \tilde{W} \) is defined by:

\[ \tilde{W} := \int_{\theta \in \Theta} \tilde{G}(v(\theta), \theta) f(\theta) d\theta \] (7)

and:

\[ \tilde{G}(v(\theta), \theta) := G(V^{-1}(v(\theta)), \theta) \]

That is, the social objective must be adjusted to incorporate the inverse of the \( V \) transformation, but once this change is made the full problem becomes equivalent to our initial representation. What does change is the precise specification of the relaxed problem. In particular the derivative of \( v \) satisfies:

\[ v_\theta(\theta) = V_u(u(\theta)) u_\theta(\theta) \] (8)

Thus the equivalent of the envelope condition (5) is:

\[ V(u(\theta)) = V(u(\theta)) + \int_2^\theta V_u(u(\theta)) u_\theta(\theta) d\theta \] (9)

This is not directly equivalent to (5) except in the trivial case when \( V \) is a linear function.10 Yet if an allocation maximises \( \tilde{W} \) subject to (2) and (9) and it satisfies increasingness of \( c(\theta) \) and \( y(\theta) \)

\[ u(c, y; \theta) = \frac{(c - \omega \left( \frac{\theta}{\bar{\theta}} \right))^{1-\sigma}}{1 - \sigma} \]

and the transformation \( V \) given by:

\[ V(u) = [(1 - \sigma) u]^{1/(1-\sigma)} \]

Clearly the associated \( v \) satisfies:

\[ v_\theta = \frac{\partial}{\partial \bar{\theta}} \omega^\prime \left( \frac{u}{\bar{\theta}} \right) \]

10Consider, for instance, preferences of the Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988) form:
in $\theta$ then, by identical logic to before, this allocation must solve the problem of maximising $\tilde{W}$ on the set of incentive-feasible allocations characterised by (2) and (6). But then it must also solve the original problem of maximising $W$ on the set of incentive-feasible allocations characterised by (2) and (3).

This is important for what follows because we will introduce into the analysis objects that are defined directly by reference to the marginal information rents $u_\phi$. But these information rents themselves depend on a particular normalisation of the problem – that is, a particular choice for $V$. Some normalisations may yield cleaner representations than others – notably when ordinal preferences can be described by a utility function that is additively separable between consumption and labour supply. We exploit such transformations wherever possible.

3 Characterising the equity-efficiency trade-off

In this section we show how the solution to the primal problem can be characterised in a form that isolates the model’s central efficiency-equity trade-off. To understand heuristically why this trade-off arises, consider the solution to the ‘first-best’ problem of maximising $W$ on the set of feasible allocations alone – ignoring incentive compatibility. Assuming interiority, this can be fully characterised by the resource constraint (2) together with two first-order conditions:

$$u_c(\theta) + u_y(\theta) = 0 \quad \forall \theta \in \Theta \tag{10}$$

$$G_u(u(\theta'), \theta') \cdot u_c(\theta') = G_u(u(\theta''), \theta'') \cdot u_c(\theta'') \quad \forall (\theta', \theta'') \in \Theta^2 \tag{11}$$

The first of these is a productive efficiency condition at the level of individual agents. It equates the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and production to the marginal rate of transformation, which is 1. The second condition deals with the optimal allocation (under $W$) of resources across individuals in the economy. There can be no marginal benefits from additional redistribution at the optimum.

Suppose that $G(u, \theta)$ takes the form $g(u)$ for some weakly concave, increasing function $g$ – that is, the social welfare criterion is anonymous, and it exhibits weak aversion to utility disparities. Then under the assumed preference restrictions it is well known that the first-best allocation must involve decreasing utility in type. This is because higher-type agents in general draw the same benefits from consumption as lower types, but are more effective producers. The latter means that the policymaker has an incentive to induce more hours of work from high types; but there is no corresponding reason to provide them with greater consumption. High productivity thus becomes a curse rather than a blessing.

whereas the expression for $u_\phi$ is far more complicated:

$$u_\phi = \left[c - \omega \left(\frac{y}{\theta}\right)\right]^{-\sigma} \frac{y}{\theta^{\sigma}} \omega' \left(\frac{y}{\theta}\right)$$

In particular $v_\theta$ is independent of $c$, whereas $u_\theta$ is not.
Such an allocation is clearly not consistent with incentive compatibility. In particular, since $u_\theta > 0$ always holds, utility will have to be increasing in $\theta$ at an allocation that satisfies the envelope condition (5). Productive efficiency, as characterised by equation (10), does remain possible, but (11) cannot simultaneously obtain. Moreover, it may be desirable to break condition (10) and introduce inefficiencies at the individual level as a means to ensure a more desirable cross-sectional distribution of resources. This will be true in particular if productive inefficiencies can be used to reduce the value of the ‘information rents’ captured in (5), which grow at rate $u_\theta$ as type increases.

A positive marginal income tax can achieve just this: by restricting the production levels of lower types it reduces the marginal benefits to being a higher type, i.e. $u_\theta$, since these benefits follow from being able to produce the same quantity of output with less effort. The lower is the output level in question, the lower are the marginal benefits to being more productive. From here there emerges a trade-off between ‘efficiency’ and ‘equity’: distorting allocations is likely to incur a direct resource cost, even as it yields benefits from a more even distribution of utility across the population.

### 3.1 Two cost terms

To characterise this trade-off more formally we first define two cost terms that will be used throughout the subsequent analysis to describe the optimal allocation. These two terms, which are defined distinctly for each $\theta \in \Theta$ at a given allocation, give the marginal resource costs to the government of changing the allocation of type $\theta$ in each of two particular ways. In this sub-section we define them, and provide some intuition for their relevance.

The two terms are easiest to rationalise in terms of the envelope condition (5), which stated:

$$u(\theta') = u(\theta) + \int_\theta^{\theta'} u_\theta(\theta) \, d\theta$$

This condition provides a link between the utility obtained by an agent of type $\theta'$, and the information rents available for every type report up to $\theta'$. We have a continuum of such restrictions: one for each $\theta' \in \Theta$. This means that in principle even the relaxed problem remains complex to analyse. The reason for defining the cost objects that we do is to allow us to describe the effects of changes to allocations that only affect this set of restrictions in a limited, manageable way. Two such changes prove particularly useful. The first is a change to the allocation of an agent of type $\theta$ that leaves constant that agent’s utility level, but reduces by a unit the value of the information rent $u_\theta(\theta)$. This will clearly leave unaffected all constraints of the form of (5) for $\theta' \leq \theta$, whilst reducing the right-hand side by a uniform (differential) quantity $d\theta$ for $\theta' > \theta$. The second change is an ‘improvement’ in the allocation of an agent of type $\theta$ such that $u(\theta)$ increases by a unit, holding constant the value of information rents earned at $\theta$, $u_\theta(\theta)$. This increases the left-hand side of the (unique) constraint for which $\theta' = \theta$, but leaves unaffected all of the other relaxed incentive-compatibility restrictions.

The two cost terms that we will use to describe an optimal allocation are the net marginal resource costs of these two changes – that is, the marginal increase in $c(\theta)$ less the marginal increase
in \( y(\theta) \) that each change implies. We first have the marginal cost of distorting the allocation of type \( \theta \) by an amount just sufficient to reduce \( u_\theta(\theta) \) by a unit, holding constant \( u(\theta) \). We label this \( DC(\theta) \) — the ‘distortion cost’. It is easily shown to take the following form:\(^{11}\)

\[
DC(\theta) := \frac{u_c(\theta) + u_y(\theta)}{u_c(\theta) u_{\theta\theta}(\theta) - u_y(\theta) u_{\theta\theta}(\theta)}
\]

Useful intuition for this object can be obtained by defining \( \tau(\theta) \) as the implicit marginal income tax rate faced by type \( \theta \):

\[
\tau(\theta) := 1 + \frac{u_y(\theta)}{u_c(\theta)}
\]

This is the value of the marginal tax rate that would be necessary to support consumption by type \( \theta \) at the chosen allocation in a decentralised equilibrium, since it sets \((1 - \tau(\theta))\) equal to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and output. We then have:

\[
DC(\theta) = \frac{\tau(\theta)}{u_{\theta\theta}(\theta) + (1 - \tau(\theta)) u_{c\theta}(\theta)}
\]

Consider a marginal change in the allocation given to type \( \theta \) that reduces this agent’s output by one unit whilst holding constant their utility. The corresponding reduction in consumption must be \((1 - \tau(\theta))\) units, since this is the agent’s marginal rate of substitution between consumption and output. Thus the policymaker loses \( \tau(\theta) \) units of resources for every unit by which output falls. This accounts for the numerator in (14). Meanwhile for every unit decrease in output and \((1 - \tau(\theta))\) decrease in consumption, the value of \( u_\theta \) will decrease by an amount \( u_{\theta\theta}(\theta) + (1 - \tau(\theta)) u_{c\theta}(\theta) \) — the term in the denominator. Thus the overall expression gives the marginal resource loss to the policymaker per unit by which information rents at \( \theta \) are reduced.

The second relevant cost term is the marginal cost to the policymaker of providing a unit of utility to an agent of type \( \theta \), along a vector in consumption-output space that is constructed to keep information rents constant. This is denoted \( MC(\theta) \) — the ‘marginal cost of utility provision’. It is likewise defined by:

\[
MC(\theta) := \frac{u_{\theta\theta}(\theta) + u_{\theta\theta}(\theta)}{u_c(\theta) u_{\theta\theta}(\theta) - u_y(\theta) u_{c\theta}(\theta)}
\]

To develop intuition regarding this object, first note that if utility is additively separable in consumption and output then \( u_{c\theta} = 0 \), and \( MC(\theta) \) collapses to \( u_c(\theta)^{-1} \) — the inverse marginal utility of consumption. Separability of this strong form means that consumption utility is entirely

---

\(^{11}\)This cost is defined as the net resource effect of changing \( c(\theta) \) and \( y(\theta) \) so as to reduce \( u_\theta(\theta) \) by a unit at the margin, holding constant \( u(\theta) \). Define \( \Delta \) as the amount by which \( u_\theta(\theta) \) is changed in a perturbation of this form. The restrictions on the changes to \( u(\theta) \) and \( u_\theta(\theta) \) imply:

\[
\frac{dc(\theta)}{d\Delta} + \frac{dy(\theta)}{d\Delta} = 1
\]

\[
\frac{dc(\theta)}{d\Delta} + \frac{dy(\theta)}{d\Delta} = 0
\]

The value of \( DC(\theta) \) is given by solving for the net effect \( \frac{dc(\theta)}{d\Delta} = \frac{dy(\theta)}{d\Delta} \).
type-independent, and thus $u_\theta$ must be unaffected by any changes to allocations that involve changes to consumption alone. This observation has been exploited to prove the ‘inverse Euler condition’ in dynamic versions of the model, as it allows for a class of perturbations to be constructed in that setting that respect global incentive compatibility.\(^{12}\)

More generally, $u_\theta$ is easily shown to remain constant provided that for every unit increase in the consumption allocation of type $\theta$ there is an increase in that agent’s output allocation of $-\frac{u_c}{u_y} \theta$ units. This output change can be rationalised as a ‘correction’ term, allowing for the fact that under non-separability a change in consumption alone would have differential effects by type. Only by a simultaneous change to the agent’s output allocation can information rents now be kept constant.\(^{13}\) Using this insight we can rewrite $MC(\theta)$ as:

$$MC(\theta) := \frac{1 + \frac{u_c(\theta)}{u_y(\theta)}}{u_c(\theta) - u_y(\theta) \frac{u_c(\theta)}{u_y(\theta)}}$$

The numerator here can then be identified as the cost to the policymaker of increasing consumption by a unit, assuming that output is adjusted by $-\frac{u_c}{u_y} \theta$ units simultaneously. The denominator is the marginal impact that this change has on the agent’s utility, so that the overall term is the marginal cost of utility provision that we seek.

### 3.1.1 Example: isoelastic, separable utility

To fix ideas it is useful to illustrate the form taken by our two cost objects when utility takes a specific functional form. One of the simplest cases arises when preferences are isoelastic and additively separable between consumption and labour supply:

$$u(c, y; \theta) = \frac{e^{c^{1-\sigma} - 1} - 1}{1 - \sigma} - \left(\frac{ye^{-\theta}}{1 + \frac{1}{\epsilon}}\right)^{1+\frac{1}{\epsilon}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (16)$$

where $\theta$ here can be understood as the log of labour productivity, $\epsilon$ is the Frisch elasticity of labour supply, and $\sigma$ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Separability gives $MC(\theta)$ a straightforward definition:

$$MC(\theta) = c(\theta)^\sigma$$  \hspace{1cm} (17)$$

\(^{12}\)See Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003) for a full discussion of the role of separability in the inverse Euler condition.

\(^{13}\)In particular, suppose that consumption and labour supply are Edgeworth complements, which corresponds to the case in which $u_{c,\theta} \leq 0$. Then higher types will benefit relatively less from an increase in consumption at a given allocation, since they are implicitly putting in less labour supply in order to produce it. Hence changing consumption alone would change $u_\theta$. But higher types also suffer less at the margin from a given increase in output, and thus accompanying the increase in consumption with an increase in production of sufficient magnitude can be enough to hold $u_\theta$ constant.
whilst – with some trivial manipulation – $DC(\theta)$ can be shown to satisfy:

$$DC(\theta) = \frac{\tau(\theta)}{1 - \tau(\theta)} \frac{\varepsilon}{1 + \varepsilon} c(\theta)^{\sigma}$$

Heuristically, the marginal cost of providing utility is the inverse of the marginal utility value of additional resources. If utility is being provided through consumption alone, which is the relevant vector to consider in the separable case, then this corresponds simply to the inverse marginal utility of consumption. As for the marginal cost of distorting allocations, $DC(\theta)$, this is increasing in the existing marginal tax rate, since reducing the output of an agent who is already paying high taxes is relatively costly to the public purse. The cost is also higher the the higher is $\varepsilon$, the Frisch elasticity of labour supply. This is because a higher elasticity generally means a greater reduction in output will be induced for a given reduction in information rents, which raises the associated productive distortions. Finally, the term $c(\theta)^{\sigma}$ in the definition of $DC(\theta)$ follows from the utility scale being applied: $DC(\theta)$ is the marginal cost of reducing the marginal utility benefit from being a higher type, $u_\theta$, by a unit. In general the lower is the marginal utility of consumption (i.e., the higher is $c(\theta)^{\sigma}$), the more resources will have to change in order to effect the desired change to $u_\theta$ – and thus the higher will be the distortion costs.

3.2 An optimal trade-off

We now present our main characterisation result, which is novel to this paper, and provide a heuristic sketch of why it must hold. The full proof is algebraically involved, and relegated to the appendix.

**Proposition 2** Any interior allocation that is constrained-optimal for the relaxed problem and for which the population expectations:

$$\mathbb{E}\left[MC(\theta)\right] := \int_{\theta\in\Theta} MC(\theta) f(\theta) \, d\theta$$

and

$$\mathbb{E}\left[G_u(u(\theta))\right] := \int_{\theta\in\Theta} G_u(u(\theta)) f(\theta) \, d\theta$$

are bounded must satisfy the following condition for all $\theta' \in \Theta$:

$$DC(\theta') \cdot f(\theta') \cdot \left\{ \mathbb{E}\left[MC(\theta) | \theta > \theta'\right] - \frac{\mathbb{E}\left[G_u(u(\theta)) | \theta > \theta'\right]}{\mathbb{E}\left[G_u(u(\theta))\right]} \cdot \mathbb{E}\left[MC(\theta)\right] \right\} \cdot (1 - F(\theta'))$$

3.2.1 Sketch of proof

Consider the consequences of raising at the margin the productive distortion applied to the allocation of an agent whose type is $\theta'$, in a manner that holds constant $u(\theta')$. The term on the
left-hand side of (19) measures the cost of this for every unit by which $u_\theta$ is reduced: $DC(\theta')$ is the per-agent marginal loss in resources for the policymaker for every unit by which information rents are reduced at $\theta'$, $f(\theta')$ is a measure of the number of agents whose allocations are being distorted.

An increase in the productive distortions applied at $\theta'$ is beneficial to the extent that it allows resources to be transferred to those who derive greater marginal benefit from them, in the eyes of the policymaker. The right-hand side of (19) is a measure of this effect. The first term in the main brackets is the marginal quantity of resources (per agent above $\theta'$) that are gained by the policymaker when utility above $\theta'$ can be reduced uniformly by a unit, holding constant information rents $u_\theta(\theta)$ at each $\theta > \theta'$. This uniform utility reduction is made possible because of the reduction in rents at $\theta'$, which eases incentive compatibility requirements for higher types. By construction this term must equal the expected value of $MC(\theta)$ above $\theta'$, multiplied by the measure of types above $\theta'$, $(1 - F(\theta'))$. The second term in the main brackets corrects for the fact that these resources were not being completely wasted before: the utility of agents above $\theta'$ is of value to any policymaker placing strictly positive weight on some or all of these agents' welfare. The exact marginal reduction in the value of the policymaker’s objective criterion is given by the expected value of $G_u(u(\theta))$ above $\theta'$, multiplied by $(1 - F(\theta'))$. To convert this into resource units we need a measure of the marginal cost of providing a unit of social welfare. Utility provision to all agents in a uniform amount is relaxed incentive-feasible whenever it holds $u_\theta(\theta)$ constant for all $\theta \in \Theta$, and the per-capita cost of this per unit of utility provided is $E[MC(\theta)]$. The impact of this on the social welfare criterion is the population average of $G_u(u(\theta))$, and thus the ratio $\frac{E[MC(\theta)]}{E[G_u(u(\theta))]}$ must provide a measure of the resource cost of generating a unit of social welfare.

Equating the left- and right-hand sides of the expression is then a statement that the marginal efficiency costs of distorting allocations must equal the marginal gains from being able to redistribute resources in a more equitable manner as information rents fall.

As the proof makes clear, the requirement that the two objects $E[MC(\theta)]$ and $E[G_u(u(\theta))]$ are bounded is not a trivial one in models for which types have unbounded upper support. In particular, given a utility function for which optimal policy is well defined – and characterised by (19) – it is often possible to take a transformation of the utility function and social objective to give an equivalent representation for which the expectation terms in (19) are no longer finite, holding the allocation constant. Imposing boundedness on the expectations is a blunt means to rule out this possibility, though of course it does not follow from the proposition that any allocation for which the expectations are unbounded may be a candidate optimum.

### 3.2.2 Discussion: inequality and progressivity

Overall, condition (19) states how policy should trade off the marginal costs of greater inefficiency imposed on lower types against the marginal benefits of being able to channel resources to those who (are considered to) benefit most from them. In this sense it can be read as a direct efficiency-equity trade-off. One of the most useful consequences of reading it in this way is that it implies model-
consistent measures of concepts such as the degree of progressivity in the income tax schedule. Indeed, it reveals an aspect of the Mirrlees model that is initially quite counter-intuitive: higher marginal tax rates imposed on agents at points low down in the type distribution are a means for achieving greater cross-sectional equality, by reducing the rents of the better-off. A higher marginal tax rate levied on, say, earnings in the region of $15,000 will reduce the incomes only of those earning $15,000 or more. The additional revenue can be used to redistribute uniformly across the population, meaning that those who experience a net benefit from the tax rise at $15,000 will be precisely those who earn less than $15,000. This means in particular that associating the shape of the marginal tax schedule with the degree of ‘progressivity’, or redistribution, implied by policy – as is commonly done in popular discussions – is likely to be a deeply misleading exercise. High taxes even on relatively low income ranges are a necessary part of raising the relative welfare of the poorest.

A far more useful set of measures of inequality will be given by taking the object in the large brackets on the right-hand side of (19) for different values of $\theta'$. Unlike alternatives, these are of direct instrumental relevance to the general problem of maximising the given social welfare criterion: the higher they are, the greater are the potential benefits under criterion $W$ from additional redistribution. These measures are thus instructive for optimal policy, even though – like all inequality measures – they do not directly express the main policy ranking over social states. They may also take particularly simple forms. For instance, if one assumes a utilitarian objective, together with additively separable utility that is logarithmic in consumption, then the relevant measure would be:

$$\mathbb{E} [c(\theta) | \theta > \theta'] - \mathbb{E} [c(\theta)]$$

for each $\theta' \in \Theta$. That is, a direct measure of consumption inequality becomes a relevant statistic for gauging the appropriateness of tax policy.

### 3.3 Pareto efficiency

Proposition 2 provides a necessary optimality condition when social preferences across possible allocations correspond to the complete ordering induced by some objective $W$. But it is of interest also to consider whether any useful policy prescriptions may arise under more parsimonious, incomplete orderings of allocations – notably the partial ordering induced by a standard Pareto criterion. An allocation $A$ is Pareto-dominated by an alternative $B$ if all agents in the economy prefer $B$ to $A$, with the preference strict in at least one case. Among the set of allocations that are relaxed incentive-feasible some may not lie on the Pareto frontier, in the sense that they are Pareto-dominated by others in the same set. The partial social preference ordering induced over allocations by the Pareto criterion is relatively uncontroversial by comparison with the (complete) ordering induced by a specific choice of $W$, such as utilitarianism or Rawlsianism. For this reason it is of interest to see how far the Pareto criterion can guide optimal tax rates.

Werning (2007) first discussed the usefulness of this criterion in an optimal tax setting, char-
acterising the requirements of Pareto efficiency in a simplified version of the Mirrlees model with additively separable utility. The cost objects that we have defined above can be manipulated to provide a more general statement, which follows with a little extra work from the proof of Proposition 2. The focus will be on ‘local’ Pareto efficiency, which we define as follows: an allocation \((c(\theta), y(\theta))\) is locally Pareto efficient within a given set if there is some \(\delta > 0\) such that there does not exist an alternative allocation \((c'(\theta), y'(\theta))\) in the same set that Pareto-dominates \((c(\theta), y(\theta))\), and for which \(|c'(\theta) - c(\theta)| < \delta\) and \(|y'(\theta) - y(\theta)| < \delta\) for all \(\theta \in \Theta\). An allocation being locally Pareto efficient among the set of relaxed incentive-feasible allocations does not rule out that it might be Pareto-dominated by an alternative allocation in that set that is not local to it, just as differential optimality conditions do not guarantee global optima. For that we would need greater structure on the problem than it is meaningful to impose. But a necessary condition for local Pareto efficiency is clearly also necessary for global efficiency, so local arguments can still deliver useful policy restrictions.

We have the following result. Its proof is in the appendix.

**Proposition 3** Consider any interior allocation and utility cardinalisation such that the expectation term \(E[MC(\theta)]\) is bounded. This allocation is locally Pareto efficient in the set of relaxed incentive-feasible allocations if and only if the following three conditions hold:

1. For all \(\theta' \in \Theta\):
   \[
   \mathbb{E}[MC(\theta) | \theta > \theta'] \cdot (1 - F(\theta')) - DC(\theta') \cdot f(\theta') \geq 0
   \] (20)

2. The left-hand side of (20) is monotonically decreasing (weakly) in \(\theta'\).

3. \(\mathbb{E}[MC(\theta)] > 0\)

The first and third conditions in the Proposition are not that surprising given the definitions of the cost terms. Clearly if the utility of all agents above some \(\theta'\) – or across the entire distribution – can be increased at negative marginal cost then a Pareto improvement can be made. Non-increasingness of the cost-gap term is perhaps less obvious. Intuitively if it didn’t hold then even with (20) satisfied it would be possible to increase the utility rents earned above \(\theta'\) by a unit, decrease those earned above \(\theta'' > \theta'\) by an offsetting unit (so that utility above \(\theta''\) remains constant), and generate surplus resources at the margin equal to the difference between the two cost gaps. The impact on utility would be zero for all agents outside the interval \([\theta', \theta'']\) and positive for those within it. Hence we would have a Pareto improvement.

As noted by Werning, there is a strong link between the question of Pareto efficient taxation and optimal taxation with a Rawlsian objective, which can be seen by comparing (20) with the main optimality condition (19). A Rawlsian optimum will satisfy inequality (20) exactly for all \(\theta' > \theta\), since the point at which it is satisfied is the point at which tax revenue would fall if still
more productive distortions were introduced at $\theta'$. That is, it characterises the peak of the famous ‘Laffer curve’ specific to agent $\theta'$. Going beyond that peak implies Pareto inefficiency – utility for higher types is reduced, without raising any net resources. A Rawlsian ‘maxmin’ criterion treats taxpayers above $\theta$ as revenue sources alone, and thus will seek the peak of the Laffer curve when trading off equity and efficiency considerations for each taxpayer above $\theta$. More general welfare criteria that put strictly positive weight on the utility of all agents in $\Theta$ can be expected to satisfy the inequality strictly: this follows trivially from (19) when the second term in large brackets is positive.

How likely is it that the Pareto criterion will be satisfied in practice? In general the non-negativity restriction (20) will simply place an upper bound on the level of the productive distortion that is tolerable at $\theta'$, which in turn will depend on the deeper properties of the utility function. Higher labour supply elasticities, for instance, are more likely to be associated with a violation of the Pareto criterion by any given decentralised tax system. But our empirical exercise below suggests such violations are not likely to be a feature of the US income tax system at present: marginal tax rates are not so high as to be the ‘wrong side’ of the Laffer curve.

### 3.3.1 Implication: the Pareto inefficiency of linear benefit withdrawal

More interesting is the non-increasingness in $\theta'$ that we require of the left-hand side of the inequality. Provided the type distribution is continuous over the relevant subset of $\Theta$, this condition will be violated by any piecewise-linear tax schedule $T(y)$ that incorporates decreases in the marginal rate at threshold income levels. Such thresholds imply a non-convex, kinked budget set, and thus induce discrete differences in the allocations of individuals whose types are arbitrarily close to one another. At this point the agent moves from a higher to a lower marginal tax rate, and $DC(\theta')$ will jump discretely downwards as a consequence, whilst the first cost term in (20) is relatively unaffected.\footnote{With no atoms in the type distribution the left-hand side of the inequality can be written:}

$$\int_{\theta'}^\Pi MC(\theta') f(\theta') d\theta - DC(\theta') \cdot f(\theta')$$

Since $MC(\theta')$ is finite the derivative of the first term with respect to $\theta'$ is always finite, and equal to $-MC(\theta') f(\theta')$. If $DC(\theta')$ drops by a discrete amount at $\theta'$ the overall term must therefore increase.\footnote{For instance a single taxpayer with three or more children claiming EITC in the US in 2013 will pay an effective marginal rate of 21.06 per cent (in addition to other obligations) on incomes between $17,530 and $46,227, as the total quantity of benefits for which he or she is eligible falls with every extra dollar earned. At this upper threshold benefits are fully withdrawn, and the effective marginal rate thus drops by 21.06 percentage points.} Decreases in piecewise-linear effective tax schedules are a common feature of benefit programmes such as the Earned Income Tax Credit in the US and the Working Tax Credit in the UK, which augment the salary of low income earners but ‘withdraw’ the associated transfer at a fixed marginal rate as earnings rise above a certain threshold. At the upper limit of this withdrawal phase the effective marginal tax rate can drop substantially,\footnote{For instance a single taxpayer with three or more children claiming EITC in the US in 2013 will pay an effective marginal rate of 21.06 per cent (in addition to other obligations) on incomes between $17,530 and $46,227, as the total quantity of benefits for which he or she is eligible falls with every extra dollar earned. At this upper threshold benefits are fully withdrawn, and the effective marginal rate thus drops by 21.06 percentage points.} inducing a non-convexity into the budget set. This will generally be Pareto inefficient. Specifically, it should be possible to deliver a strict
improvement in the welfare of a subset of the agents who presently have earnings towards (but below) the upper end of the withdrawal band, by promising them a slightly lower marginal rate were they to work a small quantity of extra hours. ‘Smoothing out’ the kink in the tax schedule would have the effect of incentivising higher earnings from those in the upper end of the withdrawal band – and thus delivering higher tax revenue from them – whilst leaving all others unaffected.

Notice that this argument is very similar to the case for a zero top marginal rate when there is a finite upper type \( \overline{\theta} \). There too, if the agent with type \( \overline{\theta} \) is stopping work with a strictly positive marginal rate then there can be no loss to a slight cut in any taxes paid on still higher earnings, since these taxes are not affecting the choice of any other agent. If \( \overline{\theta} \) chooses to work harder she must be strictly better off, and the extra work delivers extra revenue to the policymaker. The argument may be repeated until the marginal rate paid on the last cent earned is zero. Indeed, it is clear from (20) that if there is a finite upper type with strictly positive density then any Pareto efficient tax system will not distort the allocation of that type: \( DC(\overline{\theta}) = 0 \), corresponding to a zero marginal tax rate.

3.3.2 Corollary: recovering Pareto weights

A useful corollary of Proposition 3 is that if an allocation does not violate (local) Pareto efficiency then there must be a set of Pareto weights for which this allocation is optimal. More formally:

**Corollary 4** Suppose an allocation satisfies the requirements for Pareto efficiency of Proposition 3. Then there exists a social welfare function \( W \) of the form:

\[
W = \int_{\Theta} G(\theta) u(\theta) dF(\theta)
\]

such that the allocation achieves a local maximum for \( W \) on the set of relaxed incentive-feasible allocations, with the function \( G: \Theta \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+ \) satisfying:

\[
G(\theta) = \frac{\overline{G}}{\mathbb{E}[MC(\theta)]} \left\{ DC(\theta') \frac{f_\theta(\theta')}{f(\theta')} + \frac{dDC(\theta')}{d\theta'} + MC(\theta') \right\} \tag{21}
\]

for arbitrary \( \overline{G} > 0 \).

The proof of this statement follows trivially from that of Proposition 3, and is omitted. \( \overline{G} \) can be interpreted as the average Pareto weight: an obvious normalisation would be to set \( \overline{G} = 1 \).

The corollary proves useful when we consider how easily existing taxes can be rationalised. If an allocation is found to be Pareto efficient, any case for tax reform must rest on a perceived misalignment between the existing social preferences reflected in a tax system and appropriate social preferences. Equation 21 provides an expression for these existing preferences. We will infer these for a smoothed version of the 2008 US tax system in Section 5.
3.4 Discussion: primal and dual approaches

As noted in the introduction, the existing literature on the Mirrlees model contains a number of insightful optimality statements, and it is instructive to consider how ours relates to them. A useful way to understand condition (19) is as a ‘primal’ characterisation of the optimum, contrasting with the ‘dual’ approach taken by, for instance, Roberts (2000) and Saez (2001). The primal/dual distinction here is used by analogy to the closely related literature on Ramsey taxation models – in which second-best market allocations are found within a pre-specified set of distorted ‘competitive equilibria with taxes’.\(^{16}\) The primal approach to these problems is to maximise consumer utility directly over the set of real (consumption and leisure) allocations, subject to resource constraints and so-called ‘implementability’ restrictions, where the latter ensure that the allocation can be decentralised. In Mirrleesian problems the equivalent restriction is incentive compatibility. Prices (and taxes) are then implicit in the solution; they are not treated as the objects of choice. The dual approach, by contrast, optimises welfare by choice of market prices, given the known response of consumers to these prices. The resulting expressions are able to exploit well-known results from consumer theory to express optimal taxes in terms of Hicksian and Marshallian demand elasticities.\(^{17}\) Roberts (2000) and Saez (2001) independently showed how a dual approach to the Mirrlees model could be taken, considering perturbations to a decentralised non-linear tax system. As in Ramsey problems, the resulting expressions can be manipulated to be written in terms of compensated and uncompensated labour supply elasticities. This was the key insight of Saez (2001), and it has proved extremely useful for empirical work: it implies optimal taxes can be calculated from estimable elasticities. A large applied literature has emerged in response, surveyed comprehensively by Piketty and Saez (2013). These authors follow Diamond and Saez (2011) in emphasising the practical benefits of optimality statements that depend on estimable ‘sufficient statistics’ – notably the behavioural elasticities that feature in dual characterisations.

A lesson we hope will be drawn from the current paper is that a primal characterisation may be just as tractable as the dual, and thus of complementary value in drawing applied policy lessons. Though condition (19) is novel, the primal approach more generally is dominant in the growing ‘New Dynamic Public Finance’ literature, which considers the difficult problem of optimal Mirrleesian taxation over time.\(^{17}\) Given the complexity of this literature, one can understand Piketty and Saez’s comment that the primal approach “tends to generate tax structures that are highly complex and results that are sensitive to the exact primitives of the model.”\(^{18}\) But in light of the present results this judgement seems a little rash: though we have made important structural assumptions on preferences, particularly single crossing, we believe condition (19) gives a simple and intuitive characterisation of the optimum. With structural (parametric) forms assumed for preferences it can also link optimal taxes to a small number of estimable parameters, such as the Frisch elasticity of labour supply and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. We demonstrate this in the

\(^{16}\)See Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012) for useful discussions of this distinction.
\(^{17}\)See Kocherlakota (2010) and Golosov, Tsyvinski and Werning (2006) for introductions to this literature.
\(^{18}\)Piketty and Saez use the terminology ‘mechanism design approach’ in place of what is labelled the ‘primal approach’ here.
subsequent section. Therefore we hope that our primal method might be seen not in contrast to a ‘sufficient statistics’ approach to tax policy, but rather as contributing to it.

Whether the dual or primal characterisation will be simpler in general depends – here as in Ramsey models – on the structure of consumer preferences. As a general rule additive separability in the direct utility function tends to yield greater tractibility in the primal problem, as relevant cross-derivatives of the utility function can then be set to zero. This accounts for the dominant use of the primal approach in studying dynamic taxation problems of both Ramsey and Mirrleesian form, where preferences are generally assumed separable across time and states of the world.\textsuperscript{19} Dual representations, by contrast, generally depend on the complete set of cross-price elasticities in different time periods and states of the world – that is, on an intractably large Slutsky substitution matrix. For this reason the primal approach is likely to continue to dominate the literature on dynamic Mirrleesian problems. Indeed, Brendon (2012) shows how the main theoretical results of the present paper can be generalised to that setting with only minor changes.

4 A parametric example

The main advantage of our approach is the tractability of condition (19) when one is willing to impose parametric structure on individual preferences: in this case it generates simple restrictions that can be used for empirical work. In this section we demonstrate how far the condition simplifies when preferences take the isoelastic, additively separable form already discussed above. This delivers a particularly succinct expression for the main optimality trade-off that highlights some important consequences for optimal taxes of income effects in labour supply.

Throughout the exercise it is important to remember that the particular choice of utility function combines a substantive statement about the structure of ordinal preferences with a normalisation to a particular cardinal form. As discussed in section 2.2.3, the optimal allocation is invariant to equivalent utility representations provided the social preference function \( G \) is adjusted appropriately. For this reason it is advantageous to fix on a representation for which the objects \( MC \) and \( DC \) take the simplest forms available, which will be achieved by using additively separable representations of the direct utility function where possible – so that \( MC \) will equal the inverse marginal utility of consumption. For example, the set of utility functions characterised by King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988) all describe the same ordinal consumption-labour supply preference map, and so will deliver the same optimum with the relevant adjustment to \( G \). It is therefore simplest to focus on the special case of these preferences that is additively separable, with log consumption utility.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{19} A good example of the former is Lucas and Stokey (1983).
\textsuperscript{20} In dynamic models these arguments clearly no longer apply, as curvature in the period utility function governs dynamic preferences.
4.1 Isoelastic, separable preferences

Suppose that the utility function again takes the form:
\[
u(c, y; \theta) = c^{1-\sigma} - \frac{(y e^{-\theta})^{1+\frac{1}{\sigma}}}{1 + \frac{1}{\sigma}}\]  

(22)

As noted above, this means that \(MC(\theta)\) collapses to the simple object \(c(\theta)^\sigma\), whilst \(DC(\theta)\) satisfies:
\[
DC(\theta) = \frac{\tau(\theta)}{1 - \tau(\theta)} \frac{\varepsilon}{1 + \varepsilon} c(\theta)^\sigma
\]

The main optimality condition (19) can then be expressed in the following form:
\[
\frac{\tau(\theta')}{1 - \tau(\theta')} = \frac{1 + \varepsilon}{\varepsilon} \cdot \frac{1 - F(\theta')}{f(\theta')} \cdot \frac{E[c(\theta)^\sigma | \theta > \theta'] - g(\theta') E[c(\theta)^\sigma]}{c(\theta')^\sigma}
\]

(23)

where we write \(g(\theta')\) as shorthand for \(\frac{E[G_u(u(\theta)) | \theta > \theta']}{E[G_u(u(\theta))]}\).

This expression has dissected the term \(DC(\theta')\) in order to express taxes as a function of all other variables, but it remains a succinct statement of the model’s key efficiency/information-rent trade-off. It is particularly useful for drawing attention to four distinct factors that affect this trade-off:

1. The Frisch elasticity of labour supply: \textit{ceteris paribus} a higher value for \(\varepsilon\) will result in lower tax rates – a manifestation of the usual ‘inverse elasticity’ rule.

2. The (inverse) hazard rate term \(\frac{1 - F(\theta')}{f(\theta')}\): in general a lower value for this implies lower taxes. This is the mechanical effect of giving greater weight to efficiency costs when the distribution of types at \(\theta'\) is dense relative to the measure of agents above that point. As an effect it was first highlighted by Diamond (1998), and has driven much work on the shape of empirical earnings distributions in the US and elsewhere.

3. The character of social preferences, as captured by the term \(g(\theta')\): the higher is \(g\) the lower will be optimal taxes, reflecting the fact that reductions in information rents carry a higher direct cost to the government the more the welfare of relatively productive agents is valued.\(^{21}\)

4. The curvature of the utility function: for a given (increasing) consumption allocation and given set of values for \(g(\theta')\) the final fraction is easily shown to be greater the higher is \(\sigma\), and so too will be taxes. Intuitively, more curvature in the utility function makes it more costly to provide welfare to high types. The benefits from reducing information rents will consequently be higher, and higher marginal taxes are desirable as a means to reduce them.

\(^{21}\)If \(G(u, \theta)\) exhibits symmetric inequality aversion then \(g(\theta)\) will range between 0 and 1, the former corresponding to a Rawlsian social objective and the latter utilitarianism.
The first three of these factors are well understood, but the fourth has received relatively little attention in the literature to date. This is largely because the dual characterisation of the optimum provided by Saez (2001) is far simpler in the case of no income effects – nested here when $\sigma = 0$. This is no longer so acutely the case for our representation: whilst the last fraction in (23) reduces to $(1 - g(\theta))$ under quasi-linearity, for non-zero $\sigma$ it remains manageable and has an intuitive interpretation as a measure of the relative marginal cost of providing information rents to types above $\theta'$.

5 Calibration results

5.1 General approach

In this section we conduct a more direct calibration exercise to assess the appropriateness of recent US tax policy on the basis of our theoretical characterisation. Specifically, we look to place direct numerical values on the objects in the main optimality condition (19) in order to answer the question: How might the balance between efficiency and equity considerations be better struck? This exercise is based principally on consumption, earnings and tax data from the US economy in 2008, making use of the 2009 wave of the PSID data series.

We first set out the basic idea behind the empirical exercise. Recall the main optimality condition presented in Proposition 2:

$$f(\theta') \cdot DC(\theta')$$

$$= [1 - F(\theta')] \cdot \left\{ E[M(C(\theta)|\theta > \theta')] - \frac{E[G_u(u(\theta))|\theta > \theta']} {E[G_u(u(\theta))]} E[MC(\theta)] \right\}$$

This expression is useful because even when the equality does not hold, the objects in it can still be interpreted as population-weighted cost terms expressing the costs of efficiency and equity respectively. The left-hand side is the per-capita marginal quantity of resources lost if the choices of an agent of type $\theta'$ are distorted in order to reduce information rents above $\theta'$ by a unit at the margin. The object on the right-hand side is the per-capita marginal quantity of resources gained from this reduction in information rents, assuming that the total value of the social welfare criterion is being held constant.

Our aim is to test how well this efficiency-equity balance is being struck by real-world tax policy – that is, to characterise the nature of departures from optimality. Are taxes giving insufficient weight to efficiency or to equity considerations? And how does this assessment vary as productivity (or income) increases? In principle these questions can be answered by considering the difference between the two cost terms in (24) for different values of $\theta'$. To operationalise the expression we need: (a) an individual (cardinal) preference structure, (b) a social objective, (c) a tax schedule to test, and (d) a distribution of types. It will then be possible to infer an optimal consumption-income choice for all types $\theta$, and to study the properties of the (simulated) consumption-income
distribution that is induced across $\Theta$. All of the objects in (24) can then be evaluated, allowing for a direct comparison of the cost terms for each possible $\theta'$. This in turn allows for both qualitative predictions about the appropriate direction of tax reform at each given point in the earnings distribution (of the form: ‘Insufficient weight is being given to efficiency considerations for those earning $X'$), and quantitative predictions about the magnitude of gains that could be obtained by reform. We proceed by setting out in turn the manner in which we determine the objects listed (a) to (d) above.

5.1.1 Individual preferences

We demonstrated in section 2.2.3 that the constrained-optimal allocation is invariant as monotonically-increasing transformations of the utility function are applied, provided the social preference function $G(\cdot)$ is adjusted in a manner that compensates for this. Put differently, it is of no relevance to the solution of the problem whether curvature in the composite function $G(u(c, y; \theta))$ arises due to curvature in $G$ or in $u$. But clearly the overall level of curvature in this composite will have important implications for any assessment of the efficiency-equity balance, and for this reason it is useful to choose a specification that clearly separates the ordinal properties of preferences from curvature. We therefore consider the CES specification:

$$u(c, y; \theta) = \left[ \omega e^{\frac{\varepsilon - 1}{\varepsilon}} + (1 - \omega) \left(1 - ye^{-\theta} \right)^{\frac{1 - \varepsilon}{\varepsilon \theta}} \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon - 1}}$$

where $\theta$ is again to be interpreted as the log of labour productivity, and $(1 - ye^{-\theta})$ corresponds to the share of his or her time (in a year) that the agent takes as leisure. This function describes homothetic consumption-leisure preferences by a function that is homogeneous of degree one, which means that in a market setting with a single set of linear prices a given increase in income will induce the same change in utility for any pair of individuals, regardless of income differences that may exist between them. If the provision of resources to those with lower initial utility is to be considered of greater intrinsic marginal value than provision to those with higher utility, this must follow from curvature subsequently being applied via the function $G(u)$. In this sense we are normalising all curvature to derive from social preferences; but this remains a normalisation only: optimal allocations would be unaffected if the same curvature were located in the ‘true’ utility function.

The parameter $\varepsilon$ is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure. If $\varepsilon > 1$ consumption and leisure are gross complements, and if $\varepsilon < 1$ they are gross substitutes. In the special case of $\varepsilon = 1$ the utility function limits to a Cobb-Douglas form, with exponents $\omega$ and $(1 - \omega)$ on consumption and leisure respectively. This parameterisation is consistent with the stylised fact of no long-run labour supply effects from higher real wages, and for this reason we consider it a benchmark case. The parameter $\omega$ gives the strength of preferences for consumption versus leisure. Throughout what follows we calibrate it to ensure that the median income level in our simulated income series matches that for individual workers in the US as a whole in 2008.
5.1.2 Social preferences

We assume that the function $G(u, \theta)$ is independent of $\theta$, and concave in $u$, taking the form:

$$G(u; \theta) = \frac{u^{1-\gamma} - 1}{1 - \gamma}$$

$\gamma$ can then be interpreted as the elasticity of the marginal social value of providing resources (consumption and leisure) to an individual, with respect to the quantity of resources the individual is already consuming. $\gamma = 0$ corresponds to the case in which no diminishing social value accompanies enrichment, whilst taking $\gamma \to \infty$ gives the ‘Rawlsian’ limit of a max-min social objective.

5.1.3 Tax schedule

The next object that must be inputted into our analysis is an estimate for the tax schedule facing individuals in the US in 2008. This will allow us to infer a hypothetical consumption-income allocation induced by that schedule for any given preference structure, and that allocation in turn can be used to gauge the balance between efficiency and equity considerations that the estimated tax schedule strikes. Given the complexity of the actual US tax code, as well as its variations from state to state, we must clearly simplify substantially if we are to keep the analysis consistent with the Mirrlees model’s assumption of a single schedule. Our approach is to estimate a non-linear, parametric schedule linking reported 2008 income in the PSID series to the effective marginal rates that individuals are estimated to have faced. These rates are approximated by passing detailed income and demographic data on all primary and secondary household earners in the PSID series through the NBER’s TAXSIM programme, and combining the estimated marginal income tax rates that this generates with state-level consumption taxes to approximate the total effective wedge at the labour-consumption margin. This gives us a series of joint observations on income and effective marginal tax rates, to which we fit a non-linear schedule of the following form:

$$\tau(y) = \tau_l + (\tau_u - \tau_l) \left[ 1 - (sy^\rho + 1)^{-\frac{1}{\rho} - 1} \right]$$

(26)

This is a generalisation of the schedule introduced by Gouveia and Strauss (1994), and used widely in the quantitative public finance literature. It admits four degrees of freedom, with $\tau_l$, $\tau_u$, $\rho$ and $s$ to be determined. Note that $y = 0$ yields $\tau(y) = \tau_l$ and $y \to \infty$ implies $\tau(y) \to \tau_u$, so these parameters can be interpreted as the lower and upper marginal tax rates respectively. $\rho$ then controls the degree of curvature in the marginal tax schedule, and $s$ is a scaling parameter. We select $\tau_l$, $\tau_u$, $\rho$ and $s$ by minimising a sum of squared residuals between $\tau(y)$ and the estimated effective marginal rate for each individual in the PSID series. The values we obtain are (approximately)

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22 The homogeneity of degree one of $u$ helps this interpretation, as it allows the function to be read as a consumption-leisure aggregator – in the same manner as usual CES aggregators over consumption alone.

23 See http://www.nber.org/taxsim/

24 See, for instance, Conesa, Kitao and Krueger (2009) for a recent application. The standard form imposes $\tau_l = 0$ – that is, a zero marginal tax rate when incomes are zero.
Figure 1: Estimated tax schedule

$\tau_l = 0.13, \tau_u = 0.42, \rho = 1.15$ and $s = 7 \times 10^{-6}$. Figure 1 charts the fitted tax schedule against the income-marginal tax rate pairs observed in the data, for all incomes up to $200,000. As the figure shows, there is extremely high variance in marginal rates for low earners: this is chiefly a product of differing eligibility for benefits programmes by demographic status – in particular, low earners with large households to support were subject to large negative marginal rates, due to the EITC scheme. But the average effective marginal rate at the bottom of the distribution remains positive. The data also reveal that the highest effective marginal rates are faced by middle-income earners – particularly those in the EITC phase-out range. As noted above, the cut in effective marginal tax rates that is experienced at the upper end of this phase-out range is an unambiguous source of Pareto inefficiency, necessarily neglected by the smoothed schedule $\tau(y)$. This is an important qualification to our results testing the Pareto efficiency of $\tau(y)$ below.

We will assume that agents in the economy must choose subject to this schedule, and then analyse the marginal efficiency and equity costs of small changes to it. Note that the concavity of marginal tax rates in income will imply a convex budget set in consumption-income space for all individuals, so we may solve the model by imposing individual first-order conditions alone. Moreover, the fact that the marginal tax schedule is continuous means that any allocations $y(\theta)$, $c(\theta)$ that are chosen subject to it must be strictly increasing in $\theta$. This would not be true if agents were faced with a kinked budget set, as when marginal rates increase by a discrete amount at a given income level. An increasing allocation ensures the validity of the first-order approach: the allocation induced by choice subject to $\tau(y)$ will lie strictly within the set of incentive-feasible allocations, and so small changes to it that preserve relaxed incentive-feasibility must also preserve full incentive-feasibility.
Clearly this estimated schedule can only provide a first approximation to tax policy in the US, so our focus will be on robust qualitative results that emerge for large classes of alternative preference structures. If, for instance, we find that the marginal costs of additional inefficiency outweigh the marginal costs of additional inequality for all plausible preference structures when incomes are within a certain range, this will suggest improvements can readily be made by reducing actual federal tax rates applicable at such incomes – particularly if actual rates exceed those of the estimated schedule.

5.1.4 Type distribution

To obtain a distribution of types we use the joint cross-sectional earnings and expenditure data available in the 2009 wave of the PSID (relating to 2008 tax year). Making use of the more detailed expenditure data provided in recent versions of the PSID, we associate a household’s expenditure on non-durable goods with its consumption, and use this to approximate individual (rather than household) consumption levels by standard equivalence scales. This is then combined with the PSID labour income data for all agents earning (and consuming) in excess of $1000, together with an estimate of the marginal tax rate $\tau$ that the agent is likely to have faced, to infer a value for their type under the assumption that their consumption-leisure choices satisfied the intramarginal optimality condition:

$$
(1 - \tau) \omega e^{-\frac{\varepsilon}{\tau}} = (1 - \omega) e^{-\theta} 
\left(1 - ye^{-\theta}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\tau}}
$$

for a given $\omega$ and $\varepsilon$ parameterisation. It is easy to show that this equation has a unique solution for $\theta$ for any positive consumption-income pair. The effective marginal income tax rate faced by each individual is approximated using TAXSIM together with state-level consumption taxes, as set out above. Notice that when individuals reside in larger households condition (27) implicitly assumes that they are nonetheless able to be the sole consumer of the goods purchased with the last dollar that they earn at the margin.

This procedure provides us with a cross-section of values for $\theta$ particular to the chosen parameterisation, which we can then use to estimate the distribution of types in the 2008 US workforce non-parametrically. Since we use a normal smoothing kernel the estimated distribution will not generally be consistent with the Pareto earnings tails that Saez (2001) and Diamond and Saez (2011) argue is a feature of US tax return data. This property can only be generated under the present parameterisation if the type distribution has an exponential upper tail; but the upper tail of a distribution estimated with normal kernels will never be Pareto, no matter what is the true data generating process. To overcome this problem we calibrate the upper tail of the type distribution to an exponential, with exponential parameter linked multiplicatively to $\alpha$, the observed Pareto parameter in incomes.

We set $\alpha$ to 1.5, in line with the evidence provided in Diamond and

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25 We take 2008 calendar-year data as the best available proxy for 2008 tax-year data. Full details of the data series and estimation techniques used can be found in Appendix B.

26 We do not use the estimated parametric tax schedule at this stage.

27 We correct for sampling bias by use of the PSID population weights.

28 Specifically, this exponential parameter is set equal to $\alpha$ for $\varepsilon \geq 1$, and to $\varepsilon \alpha$ for $\varepsilon < 1$. These choices can easily
Saez (2011). The calibration is imposed only for the top 0.42 per cent of earners in the resulting estimated distribution \( \widehat{F}(\theta) \) – a value that is chosen to minimise discontinuities in the estimated PDF. Despite this small range of applicability it is nonetheless significant for our results for high earners, since it ensures the estimated value of \( 1 - \widehat{F}(\theta) \) remains large relative to the associated density estimate \( \widehat{f}(\theta) \), and thus that the marginal benefits of reducing information rents continue to be assessed at a non-negligible value even for very high types. If we were instead to use an estimated upper tail obtained by a normal kernel it would always be optimal to let the top rate of tax limit to zero. In this sense our results are certainly sensitive to the calibration of the upper tail of the distribution.

For our benchmark case the individual preference parameters are set to \( \varepsilon = 1 \) and \( \omega = 0.515 \). The former (which implies Cobb-Douglas utility) is well-known to be consistent with the stylised fact of balanced growth; more importantly for our purposes it also implies that the high-skill individuals who have high effective wages do not on average work longer or shorter hours than their low-skill contemporaries. As mentioned above, the value of \( \omega \) is chosen so that the median income level in the simulated series – discussed in full below – coincides with the US median personal income level in 2008, which was approximately $26,500.\textsuperscript{29}

In Figure 2 we chart the estimated distribution of labour productivity, \( e^\theta \), that corresponds to this calibration. This has a clearer economic interpretation than \( \theta \) itself: it is the annual income (in 2008 dollars) that an agent would earn if he or she were to spend no time at leisure. As one would expect, the productivity distribution replicates well-known features of the income distribution, notably a large degree of positive skewness.

Note finally that because we have not chosen to focus our attention on quasi-linear preferences the inference procedure for the type distribution is more complex than it would otherwise be. Quasi-linearity has the well-known advantage that the level of consumption does not feature in the consumption-leisure optimality condition (27), and so \( \theta \) can be inferred from earnings data alone. This allows, in particular, for detailed government data on tax returns to be applied to the exercise, as in Saez (2001) and many subsequent papers. For the general case this is not possible, as tax returns do not provide corresponding information on consumption. One could proceed by inferring post-tax income and imposing that this must equal consumption – a procedure followed, for instance, by Blundell and Shephard (2012) in their assessment of the optimal tax treatment of single mothers in the UK. But this does risk biasing the results. In particular it implies that agents with very high incomes should also have very high consumption levels, and thus very low marginal utilities of consumption. This would tend to over-state \( \theta \) for high earners, for whom savings are generally substantial. This is the main reason for our use of the PSID dataset, whose detailed consumption data allow us to infer a model-consistent type distribution without such bias.

\textsuperscript{29} Source: Current Population Survey.
5.2 Benchmark results

In this subsection we carry out the benchmark policy experiment, comparing the marginal costs of efficiency and equity that are characterised in equation (24) at each point in the earnings distribution. This is done for a simulated consumption-income allocation obtained by assuming that individuals choose optimally subject to the estimated tax schedule given above. That is, each $\theta$ solves:

$$\max_{c,y} u(c, y; \theta) \quad s.t. \quad c \leq y - T(y)$$

where $T(y)$ is given by:

$$T(y) = \int_0^y \tau(y') dy' - B$$

and $B$ is a lump-sum benefit level. Since only individuals with specific observable characteristics (such as a disability, or dependent children) are generally eligible to claim lump-sum benefits in the United States, we set $B$ to zero in the benchmark calibration. But the possibility of $B > 0$ is certainly admitted in the Mirrleesian framework, and we have confirmed that our main results are not affected by allowing annual transfers up to $5,000 to be paid to those with no pre-tax income.\textsuperscript{30}

For our benchmark case we consider a logarithmic social welfare function $G(u)$, corresponding to the parameterisation $\gamma = 1$. This is loosely equivalent to assessing that the social marginal value of providing more resources to an individual is inversely proportional to that individual’s existing resources.

\textsuperscript{30}These results are not reported due to space constraints. Details are available on request.
5.2.1 Efficiency-equity gap

Having simulated a consumption-income allocation across all types, we can then use this to graph the cost difference term $\Delta (\theta)$:

$$
\Delta (\theta) : = \left[ 1 - F (\theta') \right] \cdot \left\{ \mathbb{E} \left[ MC (\theta) | \theta > \theta' \right] - \frac{\mathbb{E} \left[ G_u (u (\theta)) | \theta > \theta' \right]}{\mathbb{E} [G_u (u (\theta))] \mathbb{E} [MC (\theta)]} \right\} \\
- f (\theta') \cdot DC (\theta')
$$

against $y (\theta)$. This term can be understood as the marginal quantity of resources that would be gained per worker in the economy from a tax reform that held constant the value of the social objective but reduced information rents by a unit at $\theta$. When it is positive the implication is that greater focus should be given to reducing inequality in welfare relative to $\theta$, since information rents are more costly than a policymaker with the chosen objective criterion should be willing to tolerate. When negative the implication is that too great a degree of productive distortion is witnessed at $\theta$, and more information rents above that point ought to be tolerated.

Figure 3 plots $\Delta (\theta)$ for the benchmark calibration, for incomes ranging between zero and $500,000. The most striking feature of the figure is the non-negativity of $\Delta (\theta)$ at all income levels: the marginal cost of distorting production in order to reduce information rents is always less than the marginal quantity of resources that are freed up as a consequence, holding constant the value of the social objective. Thus the approximated tax schedule that we consider permits greater information rents than ought to be the case for a social planner with $\gamma = 1$, across all levels of income. By increasing the marginal distortion faced by an individual earning around $17,500 and redistributing the proceeds uniformly (in utility terms) across the population, the government could – if the calibration is accurate – generate an additional $60 per taxpayer at the margin, for every unit by which information rents above $17,500 are reduced. To put this in context, the marginal cost of providing a unit utility to higher types in an incentive-compatible manner is around $430 per capita,\(^{31}\) so in this case the result is saying that for every $430 by which the relative post-tax resources of higher types (earning above $17,500) is reduced, the government can retain a surplus of $60 per capita – even after redistributing resources across the population to hold social welfare constant. As mentioned in the introduction, this corresponds to a dollar’s surplus raised per capita for every seven dollars by which post-tax resource inequality is reduced.

The cost gap term $\Delta (\theta)$ is maximised for relatively low income levels: $17,500 is slightly above the lower quartile of the simulated distribution. In itself this is an interesting result, since the focus of policy work in the optimal tax literature often gives special treatment to the problem of finding the optimal top rate, distinct from more general questions about the rest of the schedule.\(^{32}\) Yet it is not clear that the resources to be gained from getting the top rate right are any more significant than those available from striking a better trade-off elsewhere. The results here instead suggest

\(^{31}\)That is, this is the value of $\mathbb{E} [MC (\theta) | \theta > \theta']$ for the corresponding $\theta'$.

\(^{32}\)See, for instance, Chapter 2 of the first volume of the Mirrlees Review (Mirrlees, 2010).
low-to-intermediate intermediate tax bands may be of much greater consequence – offering by far
the greatest scope for marginal improvements for a policymaker with preferences of the type that
we have assumed.

But on the surface these conclusions appear contradictory. On the one hand we are finding that
tax policy is giving insufficient weight to equity concerns; on the other we are prescribing higher
marginal tax rates on relatively low earnings ranges as a means to address this. To account for
this we need to address the common confusion between marginal and average tax rates. Suppose
that one wishes to target redistribution at the very poorest in society – those earning less than
$17,500, say – in a manner that is resource-neutral. The most direct means to do this is to increase
the marginal tax rate paid at $17,500. This will reduce the post-tax resources available to all
those earning $17,500 or more: an agent’s total tax bill is the integral of the marginal rate over
all incomes up to their own. Provided that the government then uses the associated tax revenue
to redistribute uniformly across the population, there will be a net increase in welfare for those
earning less than $17,500, and a net reduction for those earning more. Raising marginal taxes paid
at $17,500 is thus a way to increase average taxes for all those who earn more than this, and reduce
them for those who earn less. Our results suggest that US tax policy in 2008 was doing too little
to target post-tax resources at very low earners in this way.

5.3 Sensitivity

The strongest result above is the qualitative one, that regardless of the tax schedule considered the
marginal costs from additional inefficiency in agents’ production decisions are always outweighed
by the marginal benefits from reducing information rents, given unit-elastic curvature in the social
objective criterion. In this subsection we test how sensitive these results are to alternative parameterisations for individual and social preferences. We consider variations along two dimensions: changes in the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure, and changes in the degree of curvature applied to utility in the social welfare objective. The last of these also provides an opportunity to assess the simulated distribution against the restrictions implied by Pareto efficiency, derived in Section 3.3 above.

5.3.1 Labour supply elasticity

We first consider the impact on our results of changing $\varepsilon$, the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure. In general $\varepsilon$ can be shown to relate to the Hicksian (compensated) elasticity of labour supply with respect to the real wage, $e^h$, according to the formula:

$$e^h = \frac{\varepsilon}{l \left( \frac{w}{e} + \frac{1}{1-\varepsilon} \right)}$$

where $l$ is labour supply and $w$ the real wage. Replacing $l$ with its model counterpart $ye^{-\theta}$ and $w$ with the effective wage $e^\theta (1 - \tau)$ this can be used to infer an implicit value for the Hicksian elasticity for each observation in the PSID data series, under the assumption that preferences take the form specified. This is useful because the Hicksian elasticity has been the object of a large number of empirical estimates, against which we can check the values implicitly being used here. At the benchmark calibration ($\varepsilon = 1$) the mean implicit value of this elasticity in the data is around 0.64, which is considerably above the value of 0.3 suggested by Chetty (2012) – itself high by comparison with most prior estimates. The implication is $\varepsilon = 1$ may be too high a calibration.33

Figure 4 thus shows the effect on the cost comparison of instead reducing $\varepsilon$ to 0.5.34 There are two notable features of the figure. First, its qualitative form is very similar to that of the benchmark case in Figure 3. In particular, the cost gap is highest (and positive) for low-to-middle income earners, peaking in this case at an income of a little over $20,000.35 Once more, the marginal cost of permitting information rents at this point in the income distribution is far greater than the marginal efficiency cost of raising tax distortions, suggesting substantial unrealised gains from reducing the relative incomes of higher earners – at least for a policymaker with the chosen preference structure. Second, and in contrast with the benchmark case, the cost gap now turns slightly negative for large income earners, suggesting that the estimated effective upper rate of tax, 42 per cent, is slightly higher than the optimal top rate, and a small reduction in upper tax rates would reduce productive distortions sufficiently to be beneficial. A possible reason for this is that

33 Against this is the fact that $\varepsilon = 1$ is the only calibration consistent with no trend in labour supply as productivity increases. When $\varepsilon < 1$ consumption and leisure are gross complements, which means that more productive agents tend to work shorter hours.

34 $\omega$ is simultaneously adjusted to continue to match a median income of $26,500.

35 The quantitative magnitude of the cost difference is clearly smaller than in the benchmark case for all income levels. But the main reason for this is simply that a unit of utility is itself worth less in dollar terms, so that the implicit change in income inequality that is being considered as utility inequality is reduced by a unit is itself now smaller.
since leisure and consumption are now gross complements, the quantity of hours worked by high types is very low. This holds down the information rents available at high earnings levels, in turn tending to raise the cost of the marginal additional distortions needed to reduce them still further.36

We take from this exercise that the qualitative result of a significant, positive gap between the marginal cost of inequality and the marginal cost of inefficiency at low incomes appears to generalise to lower values for the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure. But setting $\varepsilon = 0.5$ also appears to undermine the uniformity of the benchmark finding that marginal efficiency costs are everywhere lower than marginal equity costs: at high incomes this is no longer true. The results from the upper tail of the income distribution here ought to be treated with some care though: gross complementarity renders the associated labour supply of high types implausibly low by comparison with their lower-productivity peers.

5.3.2 Social preferences

We next consider the effect on the results of changing the degree of curvature that the policymaker applies through the parameter $\gamma$ in the function $G(u; \theta)$. There are two limiting cases of interest. First, the ‘utilitarian’ assumption of no curvature: $\gamma = 0$. In this situation there is no intrinsic inequality aversion in social preferences, in the sense that doubling an agent’s consumption and leisure levels would not change the marginal social value of giving that agent extra consumption (or leisure). The second limiting case is the Rawlsian scenario, in which $\gamma \to \infty$ and the social objective becomes a ‘max-min’ criterion. We saw above that the shape of the cost gap assessed

36To take an extreme case, if no hours were being worked then no information rents would be available. DC would be infinite in this situation.
in this case has important implications for the Pareto efficiency of the allocation under arbitrary social preference assumptions.

**Utilitarian criterion**  One might expect that when $\gamma = 0$ is imposed $\Delta(\theta)$ should always be negative. A diminishing marginal social value of providing resources to individuals is the main force motivating redistribution in the Mirrlees model, and so without it the inefficiency costs of taxation could be expected to dominate the marginal costs of inequality. But surprisingly this intuition turns out not to be correct. The reason is that the consumption-leisure ratio is not constant across types. Higher values for this ratio make it relatively more costly to provide additional utility through consumption, even while the utility function is homogeneous of degree one overall. So long as the vector that is associated with incentive-compatible utility provision has a large enough consumption component, the result is that $MC(\theta)$ will tend to grow in $\theta$. Intuitively, it remains desirable to redistribute consumable resources to those who are consumption-poor relative to the quantity of leisure they enjoy.

Figure 5 plots the cost comparison for the utilitarian case, using the benchmark calibration of $\varepsilon = 1$. For all pre-tax incomes less than $24,500 the gap is again positive, suggesting that even a policymaker with no ‘intrinsic’ aversion to inequality in the distribution of resources should be willing to tolerate greater inefficiencies at the lower end of the US income distribution, so as to reduce post-tax inequality. Recall that the calibration is matching a median pre-tax income of $26,500, so the implication is that there would be net benefits to increasing the productive inefficiency of almost the entire lower half of US earners. But for incomes between $24,500 and $117,000 the cost gap is now negative, with the higher marginal tax rates that this group is paying – together with a lower value for the inverse hazard rate term $\frac{1-F(\theta)}{f(\theta)}$ – reducing the relative marginal benefits to additional tax distortions. The cost gap then turns positive for still higher incomes: even without inequality aversion, under the benchmark calibration a top income tax rate of 45 per cent is too low.

The main lesson that we take from this exercise is the surprising endurance of the incentive to redistribute, even when this incentive is not admitted directly through curvature in the social welfare criterion. The presence of a positive cost gap at low-to-middle incomes in particular appears to be a very robust finding.

**Rawlsian criterion and Pareto efficiency**  Figure 6 plots $\Delta(\theta)$ when the social welfare criterion is assumed to be a Rawlsian ‘max-min’ function, again using the benchmark calibration $\varepsilon = 1$. This is equivalent to setting $\frac{E[G_u(u(\theta))|\theta > \theta']}{E[G_u(u(\theta))]}$ to zero for all $\theta' > \theta$ (with $\theta$ the lowest type), so it is inevitable that $\Delta(\theta)$ increases relative to the benchmark at all income levels.\(^{37}\) Hence the cost gap remains positive for all $\theta$: a Rawlsian policymaker simply seeks to maximise the quantity of tax revenue raised from each type (above the lowest), and the estimated tax system systematically sets rates too low to do this.

\(^{37}\)The simulated allocations are unaffected by social preferences.
Figure 5: Cost difference: utilitarian case

Figure 6: Cost difference: Rawlsian case
But the plot of $\Delta(\theta)$ under the Rawlsian criterion is of more particular interest as a way to gauge the Pareto efficiency of the approximated tax system. The theoretical results in section 3.3 demonstrated that a tax schedule can only be Pareto efficient if $\Delta(\theta)$ taken for the Rawlsian case is positive and decreasing for all $\theta$. Positivity implies that a reduction in productive inefficiencies at $\theta$ will not raise tax revenue, and non-increasingness guarantees that utility cannot be provided to an interval of $\Theta$ whilst generating a resource surplus. We noted above that decreasingness would almost certainly be violated by a piecewise-linear tax schedule that exhibited discrete effective reductions in the marginal tax rate – a fairly common feature of the withdrawal of income assistance programmes, and of social security obligations. Here we are instead analysing the approximated schedule graphed in Section 5.1.3, which by construction contains no such anomalies – it is smooth and concave. The aim is rather to check for possible violations of Pareto efficiency beyond these more obvious cases.

Figure 6 suggests that there was no clear violation of either the positivity or the decreasingness requirement – and thus of Pareto efficiency – by the US tax system in 2008. But in fact there is a very slight increase in the schedule, not discernible in the printed figure, for pre-tax incomes in the neighbourhood of $200,000$. This result is almost entirely driven by the properties of the estimated type distribution for high values of $\theta$, and for this reason we do not give it too much emphasis: non-parametric density estimates are notoriously unreliable in the tails. Yet it does suggest that relatively high incomes are the place to look for potential violations of Pareto efficiency. If taxes are considered poorly set in the lower end of the income distribution, where we have found the cost gap to be high and positive even in the utilitarian case, this assessment must rely on some sort of interpersonal welfare comparison: it is not a Pareto gain that is being missed there.

A positive question that follows from this analysis is what set of Pareto weights would support the observed allocation as an optimum. That is, can we find a function $G : \Theta \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ such that if the policymaker has a social objective:

$$\int_{\Theta} G(\theta) u(\theta) dF(\theta)$$

then the observed allocation is best on the relaxed incentive-feasible set?\(^{38}\) The Corollary to Proposition 3 showed how such a set of weights could be recovered straightforwardly for any given allocation. In Figure 7 we graph the weights that correspond to our benchmark simulation, for incomes between zero and $200,000$, using a logarithmic scale for incomes to ease interpretation.\(^{39}\)

We have normalised here so that the average Pareto weight across the population is one. These weights are the marginal value to the policymaker of providing an extra unit of utility to agents, based on an underlying utility function that is homogeneous of degree one. A policymaker who was averse to inequality (in the sense that $\gamma > 0$) would be observed to exhibit monotonically

\(^{38}\)This is sufficient for it to be best on the incentive-feasible set, since strict increasingness is also satisfied at the benchmark allocation.

\(^{39}\)Consistent with our finding that there is a slight violation of Pareto efficiency in the neighbourhood of $200,000$, the inferred weights turn negative for this range.
decreasing Pareto weights in this context. The inferred series instead exhibits a pattern that seems easier to account for by a political economy argument. The only agents whose (marginal) welfare is given a weight above average – for the range graphed – are those in the neighbourhood of the median income level – more precisely, those earning between around $14,000 and $38,000. This covers roughly half the population in the simulated distribution, from the 20th to the 70th earnings percentile. It suggests those at the extremes of the income distribution have not been as successful in seeing their preferences reflected in actual US taxes as those closer the centre. This is entirely consistent with our earlier analysis suggesting that even a utilitarian policymaker could gain from raising taxes on low-to-middle income ranges: doing so is a means to target resources at the very poorest, who earn lower still.

As with the test of Pareto efficiency itself, the part of this result that relates to relatively high earners is sensitive to the relatively imprecise estimation of the upper tail of the type distribution. Indeed, if one extends the income range covered in the Figure to include types in the fitted exponential tail, the associated weights grow in income without bound. Those whose types fall within the fitted tail always have a Pareto weight in excess of one. Perhaps this result can be interpreted as evidence that those with high incomes can rival the median voter for political influence, but since it depends heavily on the calibrated part of the type distribution we do not wish to exaggerate its significance.
6 Conclusion

Despite pioneering the genre, the Mirrleesian optimal income tax model stands strangely apart from most other screening problems in the manner in which it is conventionally analysed. Since the seminal work of Saez (2001) the focus of the tax literature has been on the direct role of labour supply elasticities, social preference parameters and the structure of the type distribution in shaping optimal rates. It has been rare to frame these objects in terms of the key trade-off emphasised by the parallel mechanism design literature – between the competing costs of information rents and productive efficiency. This paper has presented a new characterisation of the Mirrlees problem that is directly interpretable in terms of these latter objects, and explores the practical insights that it provides.

Specifically, we defined two marginal cost variables that capture, in turn, the cost of providing utility in a manner that keeps information rents constant, and the cost of reducing information rents in a manner that leaves utility constant. We demonstrated that these objects must satisfy a number of simple and intuitive relationships to one another at any optimum. Moreover, as cost terms they can be used to analyse existing tax schedules, providing meaningful answers to central questions such as: Does the current tax system give too much weight to efficiency to equity considerations, and how does this vary along the income scale? We showed how to operationalise such questions in section 5, inferring a distribution of productivity types for the US economy based on data from the 2009 wave of the PSID, and using this to simulate our key cost terms over the entire income distribution, given an estimated parametric marginal tax schedule.

The results strongly implied that the US tax system is giving too little weight to equity concerns relative to efficiency, particularly in its treatment of low-to-middle income earners, in the sense that the marginal costs of tolerating information rents at each point in the induced consumption-income allocation are far greater than the marginal efficiency costs that would have to be paid to reduce them. This result applies uniformly across the income distribution under our benchmark calibration, which assumes logarithmic curvature of the social welfare criterion in individual utility levels. Surprisingly, it also applies for the lower half of the income distribution even when social preferences are utilitarian, aggregating individual utility functions that are themselves homogeneous of degree one in consumption and leisure – so that social preferences exhibit no ‘intrinsic’ aversion to inequality. Even then there would be gains to reducing the gap in post-tax utility levels between low earners and those with higher productivity.

On the surface this result is contradictory. It seems to be saying that the tax system gives insufficient weight to equity concerns, but that the best response to this is to tax low-to-middle income earners more! This highlights an important confusion that can often arise in popular discussions about income taxes, whereby the marginal tax rate an individual faces is conflated with their average tax rate. An increase in the marginal tax rate paid on earnings in the region of, say, $15,000 reduces the post-tax income of all those who earn more than this income level, and holds constant the income of all those who earn up to this income level. If the proceeds are then redistributed uniformly across the population, for instance by providing a fixed, positive benefit
level that one can receive irrespective of earnings, the net beneficiaries of the combined reform are precisely those earning less than $15,000 originally. Higher marginal tax rates on low-to-middle income ranges are therefore best interpreted as a means to target redistribution to the very poorest earners. They are the only way to reduce post-tax income dispersion among those in the lower end of the income distribution. This is just as desirable as reducing inequality more generally under a generalised utilitarian criterion of the sort we consider.

Our theoretical results also provide a new test of the Pareto efficiency of any given tax system, substantially generalising the approach of Werning (2007). When we apply this test to the approximated 2008 tax schedule we find no clear violation of Pareto efficiency; but importantly the pattern of Pareto weights that is required for the given allocation to be optimal does not place higher weighting on the marginal welfare of poorer agents, as would be expected of a social planner who was averse to inequality. Instead it is those in the middle of the income distribution who receive disproportionately high weighting, consistent with a ‘median voter’ theory of tax policy. It will be interesting to see how far this result carries through under equivalent simulations based on different tax years and data series.

Some of these results are clearly quite contentious, and for this reason we stress that our approach is certainly not without its limitations. The most significant of these is that we rely on the static version of the Mirrlees model. This is important because the static model assumes the tax system is the only means individuals have for providing themselves with consumption insurance – a factor that may bias policy preferences in favour of more distribution than would be optimal were precautionary savings behaviour appropriately incorporated. Note, for instance, that if incomes had a large stochastic component then those with high earnings one year would not necessarily consume much more than those whose earnings were substantially lower, and thus differences in the marginal cost of providing utility to each of them might not be so substantial.

Nonetheless, it is not clear why developing the analysis in a dynamic setting should be expected to reverse the main results on the relative merits of tax reform. So for now at least are left with a puzzle: given the improved redistribution that such a strategy could effect, why does the US not apply higher marginal tax rates on low-to-middle income ranges?

References


A Theory appendix

A.1 Preferences and single crossing

We demonstrate here the claim in Section 2.1 that the single crossing property is implied whenever agents have common preferences over consumption and labour supply, whilst differing in their ability to convert labour supply into output according to $\theta$. Specifically, suppose that preferences over consumption and labour supply for all agents are described by a common utility function $\tilde{u} : \mathbb{R}_+^2 \to \mathbb{R}$, where $\tilde{u}$ is $C^2$, increasing in its first argument (consumption) and decreasing in its second (labour supply), and describes normal demands for both consumption and leisure. Labour supply, in turn, can be converted into output according to a $C^2$ function $l : \mathbb{R}_+ \times \Theta \to \mathbb{R}_+$. $l(y; \theta)$ thus gives the number of hours that it takes an individual whose type is $\theta$ to produce $y$ units of output. We assume $l_y > 0$, $l_\theta < 0$ and $l_{y\theta} \leq 0$. The latter two restrictions imply that higher values of $\theta$ are unambiguously associated with higher productive efficiency. Note that this setup nests the case in which $\theta$ is a linear productivity parameter, which means $l(y; \theta) = \frac{y}{\theta}$.

We can then define the function $u : \mathbb{R}_+^2 \times \Theta \to \mathbb{R}$ by:

$$u(c, y; \theta) := \tilde{u}(c, l(y; \theta)) \quad (29)$$

Given the restrictions that we have imposed on the $\tilde{u}$ and $l$ functions, the single crossing property follows:

**Lemma 5** $u(c, y; \theta)$ defined in (29) satisfies single crossing in $\theta$. That is, for any distinct pair of allocations $(c', y')$ and $(c'', y'')$ such that $(c', y') < (c'', y'')$ (in the product order sense) and $\theta' < \theta''$, if $u(c'', y''; \theta') \geq u(c', y'; \theta')$ then $u(c'', y''; \theta'') > u(c', y'; \theta'').$

**Proof.** Geometrically it is easy to see that this will be true provided the derivative condition (1) is satisfied at all allocations – that is, indifference curves in output-consumption space are uniformly
'flattening' in \( \theta \). We have:

\[
\frac{d}{d\theta} \left( -\frac{u_y(c, y; \theta)}{u_c(c, y; \theta)} \right) = -\frac{u_y(c, y; \theta)}{u_c(c, y; \theta)} + \frac{u_y(c, y; \theta) u_{\theta\theta}(c, y; \theta)}{u_c(c, y; \theta)} u_{\theta\theta}(c, y; \theta) \]

These derivatives satisfy:

\[
\begin{align*}
    u_c(c, y; \theta) &= \tilde{u}_c(c, l(y; \theta)) \\
    u_y(c, y; \theta) &= \tilde{u}_l(c, l(y; \theta)) l_y(y; \theta) \\
    u_{\theta\theta}(c, y; \theta) &= \tilde{u}_{\theta\theta}(c, l(y; \theta)) l_y(y; \theta) + \tilde{u}_l(c, l(y; \theta)) l_{\theta\theta}(y; \theta)
\end{align*}
\]

Plugging into the previous expression gives:

\[
\frac{d}{d\theta} \left( -\frac{u_y(c, y; \theta)}{u_c(c, y; \theta)} \right) = -\frac{\tilde{u}_l(c, l(y; \theta)) l_y(y; \theta)}{\tilde{u}_c(c, l(y; \theta))} + \frac{\tilde{u}_{\theta\theta}(c, l(y; \theta)) l_{\theta}(y; \theta)}{\tilde{u}_c(c, l(y; \theta))}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
    &= \frac{\tilde{u}_l(c, l(y; \theta)) l_y(y; \theta)}{\tilde{u}_c(c, l(y; \theta))} \leq 0 \\
    &= \frac{\tilde{u}_l(c, l(y; \theta)) l_{\theta}(y; \theta)}{\tilde{u}_c(c, l(y; \theta))} \leq 0 \left[ \frac{\tilde{u}_{\theta\theta}(c, l(y; \theta))}{\tilde{u}_l(c, l(y; \theta))} \right] \geq 0
\end{align*}
\]

where the sign of the last term follows from normality in consumption, which implies increases in labour supply must raise the value of \(-\frac{\tilde{u}_l}{\tilde{u}_c}\). This confirms condition (1), completing the proof. 

### A.2 Proof of Proposition 1

We first establish that an incentive-feasible allocation implies increasing \( c \) and \( y \) schedules together with condition (4). Increasingness follows almost immediately from single crossing. Suppose \((c(\theta'), y(\theta')) > (c(\theta''), y(\theta''))\) for some \( \theta'' > \theta' \). \( \theta' \) must weakly prefer \((c(\theta'), y(\theta'))\) to \((c(\theta''), y(\theta''))\) at an incentive-feasible allocation, but then single crossing implies \( \theta'' \) must have a strict preference for \((c(\theta'), y(\theta'))\), violating incentive compatibility.

To obtain (4), note that for all \( \theta < \tilde{\theta} \) we can find \( \varepsilon > 0 \) such that for all \( \delta \in [0, \varepsilon], \theta + \delta \in \Theta \), and thus by incentive compatibility we have:

\[
u(c(\theta), y(\theta) ; \theta) \geq u(c(\theta + \delta), y(\theta + \delta) ; \theta)
\]  

(30)
and
\[ u(c(\theta + \delta), y(\theta + \delta); \theta + \delta) \geq u(c(\theta), y(\theta); \theta + \delta) \quad (31) \]

Rearranging and taking limits we have:
\[ \lim_{\delta \to 0} \left[ \frac{u(c(\theta + \delta), y(\theta + \delta); \theta + \delta) - u(c(\theta), y(\theta); \theta)}{\delta} \right] \leq 0 \quad (32) \]
\[ \lim_{\delta \to 0} \left[ \frac{u(c(\theta + \delta), y(\theta + \delta); \theta + \delta) - u(c(\theta), y(\theta); \theta + \delta)}{\delta} \right] \geq 0 \quad (33) \]

But by the assumed continuity properties of \( u \) these two objects must coincide. Thus the partial right-derivative of utility with respect to type report at an incentive-feasible allocation exists, and is equal to zero.\(^{40}\) An identical argument establishes that the corresponding left-derivative exists and is equal to zero for all \( \theta > \theta' \). We can summarise this by:
\[ \frac{\partial}{\partial \sigma} [u(c(\sigma), y(\sigma); \theta)]|_{\sigma=\theta} = 0 \]

Totally differentiating utility with respect to type gives:
\[ \frac{d}{d\theta} [u(c(\theta), y(\theta); \theta)] = \frac{\partial}{\partial \sigma} [u(c(\sigma), y(\sigma); \theta)]|_{\sigma=\theta} \]
\[ + \frac{\partial}{\partial \theta} [u(c(\sigma), y(\sigma); \theta)]|_{\sigma=\theta} \quad (34) \]

Condition (4) follows immediately.

We then need that a pair of increasing allocation schedules satisfying (4) will be globally incentive compatible. Suppose otherwise. Then there must exist a pair of allocations \((c(\theta'), y(\theta'))\) and \((c(\theta''), y(\theta''))\) for some \( \theta' < \theta'' \) such that:
\[ u(c(\theta''), y(\theta''); \theta') > u(c(\theta'), y(\theta'); \theta') \]

Suppose first that \( \theta' > \theta'' \). We have:
\[ u(c(\theta'), y(\theta'); \theta') = u(c(\theta''), y(\theta''); \theta'') \]
\[ + \int_{\theta''}^{\theta'} u_c(c(\theta''), y(\theta''); \sigma) \, d\sigma \]
\[ + \int_{\theta''}^{\theta'} \frac{d}{d\sigma} [u(c(\sigma), y(\sigma); \theta')] \, d\sigma \]
\[ = u(c(\theta''), y(\theta''); \theta') \]
\[ + \int_{\theta''}^{\theta'} \frac{d}{d\sigma} [u(c(\sigma), y(\sigma); \theta')] \, d\sigma \quad (35) \]

\(^{40}\) Notice that this does not require continuity in the allocation schedules \( c(\cdot) \) and \( y(\cdot) \).
From the envelope condition we know:
\[ \frac{d}{d\sigma} \left[ u\left(c(\sigma), y(\sigma) ; \bar{\theta}\right) \right]_{\bar{\theta}=\sigma} = 0 \]
Since \( \theta' \geq \sigma \) for all \( \sigma \) in the integral in (36) it follows by single crossing that each term under the integral must be weakly positive. But clearly this implies:
\[ u\left(c(\theta') , y(\theta') ; \theta'\right) \geq u\left(c(\theta'') , y(\theta'') ; \theta'\right) \]
contradicting the earlier supposition. A symmetric argument can be applied when \( \theta'' > \theta' \), completing the proof.

A.3 Proof of Proposition 2

An allocation that is constrained-optimal for the relaxed problem solves:
\[
\max_{c(\theta), y(\theta)} \int_{\theta \in \Theta} G\left(u\left(\theta, \theta\right) f\left(\theta\right) d\theta \right. \tag{37}
\]
subject to:
\[
\begin{align*}
u\left(\theta'\right) &= u\left(\theta\right) + \int_{\theta}^{\theta'} u_{\theta}\left(\theta\right) d\theta \\
\forall &\theta' \in \Theta \tag{38}
\end{align*}
\]
\[ -R \geq \int_{\theta \in \Theta} \left[ c\left(\theta\right) - y\left(\theta\right) \right] f\left(\theta\right) d\theta \tag{39} \]

To obtain a set of necessary conditions for this problem we construct a Lagrangian with multiplier \( \mu\left(\theta'\right) f\left(\theta'\right) d\theta' \) on the first constraint, and \( \eta \) on the second. There is a technical issue in asserting first-order conditions when \( \Theta \) has no upper support, since in this case a change to \( u_{\theta}\left(\theta\right) \) affects incentive compatibility constraints across an unbounded range of types, and the associated shadow cost term is not guaranteed to be bounded. We first present a simple proof for the case in which \( \Theta \) has finite upper support \( \bar{\theta} \), and then consider how far the arguments generalise to the case in which \( \bar{\theta} = \infty \).

When \( \bar{\theta} < \infty \) first-order conditions with respect to \( c\left(\theta\right) \) and \( y\left(\theta\right) \) for \( \theta > \bar{\theta} \) may be taken piecewise in the usual way.\(^{41}\)
\[
0 = G_{u}\left(\theta'\right) u_{c}\left(\theta'\right) f\left(\theta'\right) + u_{c}\left(\theta'\right) \mu\left(\theta'\right) f\left(\theta'\right) - u_{c\theta}\left(\theta'\right) \int_{\theta'}^{\bar{\theta}} \mu\left(\theta\right) f\left(\theta\right) d\theta - \eta f\left(\theta'\right) \tag{40}
\]

\(^{41}\)Strictly these conditions need only hold \( F\)-almost everywhere on \( \Theta \) in order to obtain the maximum, but there is no loss in asserting them everywhere.
0 = \sum u_y (\theta') f (\theta') + u_y (\theta') \mu (\theta') f (\theta') \hfill (41)

\begin{align*}
&\quad -u_y (\theta') \int_{\theta'}^{\theta} \mu (\theta) f (\theta) d\theta + \eta f (\theta')
\end{align*}

Meanwhile the conditions with respect to \( c (\theta) \) and \( y (\theta) \) each imply:

\begin{align*}
0 &= \int_{\theta \in \Theta} \mu (\theta) f (\theta) d\theta \quad (42)
\end{align*}

Pre-multiplying (40) by \( u_y (\theta') \) and (41) by \( u_c (\theta') \), and combining the two, gives:

\begin{align*}
\eta [u_y (\theta') + u_c (\theta')] f (\theta')
\quad &= \left[ u_c (\theta') u_y (\theta') - u_y (\theta') u_c (\theta') \right] \int_{\theta'}^\theta \mu (\theta) f (\theta) d\theta
\end{align*}

Or:

\begin{align*}
\eta DC (\theta') f (\theta') &= \int_{\theta'}^\theta \mu (\theta) f (\theta) d\theta \quad (44)
\end{align*}

using the definition of \( DC (\theta') \) given in the main text.

Summing (40) and (41) and rearranging gives:

\begin{align*}
(G_u (\theta') + \mu (\theta')) f (\theta')
\quad &= \frac{u_c (\theta')}{u_c (\theta') + u_y (\theta')} \int_{\theta'}^\theta \mu (\theta) f (\theta) d\theta
\end{align*}

By definition we have:

\begin{align*}
\frac{u_c (\theta') + u_y (\theta')}{u_c (\theta') + u_y (\theta')} DC (\theta') = MC (\theta') \quad (46)
\end{align*}

so this relationship simplifies to:

\begin{align*}
G_u (\theta') + \mu (\theta') = \eta MC (\theta') \quad (47)
\end{align*}

Integrating this condition over \( \Theta \) and using (42) gives an expression for \( \eta \), the shadow value of extra resources:

\begin{align*}
\eta &= \frac{\int_{\theta \in \Theta} G_u (\theta) f (\theta) d\theta}{\int_{\theta \in \Theta} MC (\theta) f (\theta) d\theta}
\quad = \frac{\mathbb{E} \left[ G_u (\theta) \right]}{\mathbb{E} \left[ MC (\theta) \right]} \quad (48)
\end{align*}
Replacing the terms in $\mu(\theta)$ in the integral in (44), we have:

$$
\eta DC (\theta') f (\theta') = \int_{\theta'}^{\theta} \left[ \eta MC (\theta) - G_u (\theta) \right] f (\theta) d\theta
$$

(49)

Or, substituting out $\eta$:

$$
DC (\theta') f (\theta') = \int_{\theta'}^{\theta} \left[ MC (\theta) - G_u (\theta) \frac{E [MC (\theta)]}{E [G_u (\theta)]} \right] f (\theta) d\theta
$$

(50)

The main expression then follows from the definition of conditional expectations.

When $\theta = 1$ it is not immediate that the integral $\int_{\theta'}^{\theta} \mu (\theta) f (\theta) d\theta$ will be bounded, even though the individual shadow cost terms $\mu (\theta)$ are. Indeed it is easy to construct counter-examples in which this is not the case at an optimal plan. But in any event we may still apply a calculus of variations argument, taking first-order necessary conditions for an optimum from the Lagrangian by allowing for carefully-constructed joint changes in $c (\theta')$ and $y (\theta')$, such that information rents at $\theta'$ are held constant. In particular, suppose that for every unit by which $c (\theta')$ is increased at the margin we additionally increase $y (\theta')$ by an amount $- \frac{u_{c\theta}(\theta')}{u_{y\theta}(\theta')}$. By construction this does not affect the incentive compatibility constraints above $\theta'$, meaning that a necessary optimality condition can be stated that depends only on objects specific to $\theta'$:

$$
0 = \left[ G_u (\theta') + \mu (\theta') \right] \left[ u_c (\theta') - \frac{u_{c\theta}(\theta')}{u_{y\theta}(\theta')} u_{y\theta}(\theta') \right] f (\theta') - \eta f (\theta') \left[ 1 + \frac{u_{c\theta}(\theta')}{u_{y\theta}(\theta')} \right]
$$

(51)

Applying the definition of $MC (\theta)$, this is easily seen to be a re-statement of (47):

$$
G_u (\theta') + \mu (\theta') = \eta MC (\theta')
$$

(52)

It follows that the object $\int_{\theta'}^{\theta} \mu (\theta) f (\theta) d\theta$ will be bounded whenever $\int_{\theta'}^{\theta} [G_u (\theta) - \eta MC (\theta)] f (\theta) d\theta$ is likewise. When this is true (by assumption), our earlier arguments can be applied to establish the optimality condition.

### A.4 Proof of Proposition 3

An allocation is Pareto efficient in the set of relaxed incentive-feasible allocations if every alternative allocation within that set features at least one individual who is made strictly worse off. Equivalently, if one fixes the cardinal structure of utility then an allocation is Pareto efficient if for every alternative relaxed incentive-feasible allocation there exists a set of fixed Pareto weights

\footnote{In particular, cases exist in which the multiplier integral is bounded under one cardinalisation of the utility function and social welfare objective, but under not other, equivalent representations of the problem. Details are available on request.}
such that a policymaker assessing social welfare according to the integral:

\[ W = \int_{\theta \in \Theta} G_u(\theta) u(\theta) f(\theta) \, d\theta \quad (53) \]

prefers the original allocation to the alternative.\(^{43}\)

We consider 'only if' first. Suppose that an allocation is Pareto efficient. We must demonstrate that the three conditions in the Proposition must be true. We start with the third. Suppose this is not true: then a marginal change to the allocation that raises the utility of all agents by a unit at the margin, holding \(u_{\theta}(\theta)\) constant for all \(\theta\), must raise surplus resources. This is clearly a Pareto improvement.

Now consider the first condition. From the proof of Proposition 2 we know that if the following inequality holds:

\[ DC(\theta') f(\theta') > \int_{\theta'}^{\bar{\theta}} \left( MC(\theta) - \frac{E[MC(\theta)]}{E[G_u(\theta)]} G_u(\theta) \right) f(\theta) \, d\theta \quad (54) \]

then it must be possible for the policymaker with (marginal) Pareto weights \(G_u(\theta)\) to improve on the given allocation – generating the same value for social welfare with fewer resources. Specifically, this can be done by reducing \(u_{\theta}(\theta')\) at the margin and increasing the relative utility of all agents above \(\theta'\), adjusting the total quantity of resources used as required in order to hold social welfare constant.\(^{44}\) Now, suppose (contrary to the Proposition) that the following is true:

\[ \int_{\theta'}^{\bar{\theta}} MC(\theta) f(\theta) \, d\theta - DC(\theta') f(\theta') < 0 \quad (55) \]

Then, irrespective of the Pareto weights applied, we have:

\[
\begin{align*}
DC(\theta') f(\theta') & - \int_{\theta'}^{\bar{\theta}} MC(\theta) - \frac{E[MC(\theta)]}{E[G_u(\theta)]} G_u(\theta) \, f(\theta) \, d\theta \\
& > DC(\theta') f(\theta') - \int_{\theta'}^{\bar{\theta}} MC(\theta) f(\theta) \, d\theta \\
& > 0
\end{align*}
\]

This means that for any set of Pareto weights, the policymaker will benefit from a marginal reduction in the utility rents at \(\theta'\). Hence a policy that reduces these rents at the margin must be a Pareto improvement.\(^{45}\)

\(^{43}\) That is, we have here set \(G(u, \theta) = G_u(\theta) \cdot u\) for all \(\theta \in \Theta\). The subscript on \(G_u(\theta)\) is retained simply to make comparison with the previous proof direct.

\(^{44}\) This is the function of the second term in the integral.

\(^{45}\) Alternatively, a unit reduction in \(u_{\theta}(\theta')\) and a unit increase in \(u(\theta)\) for all \(\theta > \theta'\) must itself generate surplus resources at the margin, even before a further adjustment is made to keep social welfare constant. This further adjustment always generates further resources, since the net effect of the perturbation without it is just to raise utility for a subset of \(\Theta\).
A similar argument follows by taking first differences. We know that if:

\[ DC(\theta') f(\theta') - DC(\theta'') f(\theta'') > \int_{\theta'}^{\theta''} \left[ MC(\theta) - \frac{\mathbb{E}[MC(\theta)]}{\mathbb{E}[G_u(\theta)]} G_u(\theta) \right] f(\theta) d\theta \]

holds then the policymaker with Pareto weights \( G_u(\theta) \) can make an improvement by raising \( u_\theta(\theta') \) (generating \( DC(\theta') f(\theta') \) resources at the margin), reducing \( u_\theta(\theta'') \) (at cost \( DC(\theta'') f(\theta'') \)), and raising the relative utility of all agents between \( \theta' \) and \( \theta'' \) by a unit at the margin. The cost of doing this is lower than the shadow cost of the resources it consumes. Now suppose that:

\[ \int_{\theta'}^{\theta''} MC(\theta) f(\theta) d\theta - DC(\theta') f(\theta') \]

is increasing in \( \theta' \) over some interval \( I \subset \Theta \). Then pick \( \theta', \theta'' \in I \), with \( \theta'' > \theta' \). Clearly we have:

\[ DC(\theta') f(\theta') - DC(\theta'') f(\theta'') - \int_{\theta'}^{\theta''} MC(\theta) f(\theta) d\theta < 0 \]

As before, this will imply

\[ DC(\theta') f(\theta') - DC(\theta'') f(\theta'') > \int_{\theta'}^{\theta''} \left[ MC(\theta) - \frac{\mathbb{E}[MC(\theta)]}{\mathbb{E}[G_u(\theta)]} G_u(\theta) \right] f(\theta) d\theta \]

is true for all possible sets of Pareto weights; the allocation cannot be Pareto efficient.

Now we take the ‘if’ part. Given an allocation such that the three conditions of the Proposition are true, it is sufficient to show that a set of strictly positive Pareto weights exists for which a marginal change in allocations does not deliver an improvement. Since optimal choice is clearly invariant to changes in the scale of these weights, we can normalise \( \mathbb{E}[G_u(\theta)] \) to 1 and focus on finding a set of values for \( G_u(\theta) \) such that the necessary conditions for a local optimum are satisfied when these \( G_u(\theta) \) values are the Pareto weights. From Proposition 2 this requires that we can find a function \( G_u : \Theta \to \mathbb{R}_+ \) that satisfies, for all \( \theta' \in \Theta \):

\[ \int_{\theta'}^{\theta''} MC(\theta) f(\theta) d\theta - DC(\theta') f(\theta') = \mathbb{E}[MC(\theta)] \int_{\theta'}^{\theta''} G_u(\theta) f(\theta) d\theta \]

Since \( \mathbb{E}[MC(\theta)] > 0 \) this is clearly possible whenever the left-hand side is positive decreasing.\(^{46}\)

\(^{46}\)The integral on the left-hand side is clearly continuous in \( \theta' \) for all atomless type distributions, since \( MC(\theta') \) is finite for any (finite) allocation. But it is possible that we may have discrete increases in \( DC(\theta') f(\theta') \), in which case the integral on the right-hand side will need to be discontinuous in \( \theta' \) at corresponding points. This requires a slight generalisation of the notation, but can be admitted without difficulties. Note that \( \int_{\theta'}^{\theta''} G_u(\theta) f(\theta) d\theta \) is a standard cdf on \( \Theta \), summarising the relative weight placed by the policymaker on the marginal welfare of individuals up to \( \theta' \). As written this measure does not admit atoms. If we replace it with a general measure \( f(\theta) \) that does, discontinuities are perfectly admissible via such atoms. This corresponds to the case in which the policymaker has special concern
B Empirical appendix

We use this appendix to present a more detailed account of the estimation procedure for the type density applied in section 5.

B.1 Data

Our main data source in inferring both the distribution of productivity types and the approximate US tax schedule in 2008 is the 2009 wave of the PSID, which contains detailed individual income and household consumption data from 8690 households relating to the 2008 calendar year. For each head of household and spouse (where present, as defined by PSID) we construct a labour income series as the sum of the individual’s reported non-business (variable ER46829) and business (ER46808) labour incomes. These data are then identified with the model variable $y$ for each individual. We identify household-level consumption with expenditure on non-durable goods over the year, divided into the following categories: food, utilities, transport, clothing, trips and vacations, and other recreation. The following table lists the precise PSID series included in each category.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Data series</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>Food at home (ER42712, ER42722), delivered food (ER42716, ER42726), food eaten out (ER42719, ER42729)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>Heating (ER42112), electricity/gas (ER42114, ER42116), water (ER42118), telephone/internet (ER42120), other utilities (ER42124)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>Petrol (ER42808), parking (ER42809), bus/train (ER42810), cabs (ER42811), other (ER42812)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>ER42827, ER42829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trips &amp; vacations</td>
<td>ER42832, ER42834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other recreation</td>
<td>ER42837, ER42839</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The durable consumption levels thus obtained at the household level are then converted into individual consumption values by dividing by an ‘equivalence scale’. We use the scale applied by Eurostat for this purpose, which assigns a value of 1 to the household head, 0.5 to any additional for a zero-measure subset of the population, so that the Pareto weight attached to this subset is non-zero relative to the population aggregate.
adults, and 0.3 to each child. Thus a family of two adults and two children will have an equivalence scale of 2.1. The individual-level consumption data obtained in this way are identified with the model variable \( c \).

Our aim is to infer a series for \( \theta \) based on the individual optimality condition (27), given the series for \( c \) and \( y \). For this we further need data on effective marginal tax rates for each individual in the sample. Of relevance to us is the overall tax wedge that the individual faces, \( \tau \), which satisfies:

\[
1 - \tau = \frac{1 - \tau^m}{1 + t}
\]

where \((1 - \tau^m)\) is the rate at which disposable income increases in pre-tax income (allowing for the effects of tax credits and social security contributions), and \( t \) is the sales tax rate. Estimated values for \( \tau^m \) are obtained using the NBER’s TAXSIM programme,\(^{47}\) given PSID data on pre-tax income (labour and non-labour), age, marital status and other variables of relevance to tax liabilities.\(^{48}\) Values for \( t \) are given by the sum of state-level sales taxes and the average value of local taxes on a state-by-state basis, for each of the 50 states plus DC. Both come from publicly available data published by the Tax Policy Centre.\(^{49}\) Each individual is then assumed to face the sales tax of their state of residence.

Together these steps give us 13,412 individual-level observations on \( c \), \( y \) and (with the exception of overseas territories residents) \( \tau \). We then discard entries for which either income or consumption is less than \$1000, as well as all observations from US overseas territories (for which we have no marginal tax rate data). The income cut-off is motivated by the fact that our type-inference procedure is based on the individual striking an optimal intensive-margin trade-off. Individuals who earn little or no income are better characterised as being at a corner solution in their labour-consumption choice problem. The income cut-off results in 3087 observations being dropped. There are far fewer below the \$1000 consumption threshold: 152 individuals in total. Many of these are also below the income threshold. We motivate this threshold on the grounds of possible mis-reporting or other anomalies: 42 of the observations dropped because of it have \( c = 0 \).

We are left with 10,250 observations from which to infer types. This is done by solving optimality condition (27) numerically for \( \theta \) at each observation, given \( c \), \( y \), \( \tau \) and a set of parameter values.\(^{50}\) This gives us a set of \( \theta \) values, from which we wish to obtain an estimate of the population distribution.

**B.2 Inferring a type distribution**

Based on the \( \theta \) series we estimate a type distribution non-parametrically, using a normal smoothing kernel and a bandwidth that is optimised (minimising integrated mean squared error) for a Gaussian

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\(^{47}\) See http://users.nber.org/~taxsim/.

\(^{48}\) The procedure used follows standard practice for obtaining TAXSIM estimates based on PSID data, as documented in Butrica and Burkhauser (1997). Full details available on request.

\(^{49}\) See www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/Content/PDF/state_sales_tax.pdf.

\(^{50}\) In the Cobb-Douglas case (\( \xi = 1 \)) it is possible to solve explicitly for \( \theta \). This speeds up the procedure considerably.
data-generating process. To correct for sampling bias we weight observations using the individual weights provided by the PSID (variable ER34046), integrating these into the estimator following a procedure set out in Jones (1991). As mentioned in the main text, the estimated distribution obtained by this procedure will generally be unable to reproduce the stylised fact of Pareto tails in the observed income distribution: with a finite quantity of data the tails are generally poorly estimated, particularly outside of the observed data range.\textsuperscript{51} For this reason we replace the upper \( q \) per cent of the estimated distribution with an exponential distribution, where \( q \) is chosen endogenously to minimise discontinuities in the composite pdf that results. The exponential parameter for this distribution is set to \( \alpha \) when \( \varepsilon \geq 1 \), and \( \varepsilon \alpha \) when \( \varepsilon < 1 \), where \( \alpha \) is the Pareto parameter in observed income data that we wish to match and \( \varepsilon \) is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure. It can be shown that these choices generate pre-tax income distributions that are approximately Pareto in the upper tails, with Pareto parameter \( \alpha \), whenever the upper rate of income tax is a constant and consumption is approximately equal to disposable income for high earners. The calibrated, parametric specification for the upper tail is useful in subsequent calculations, as it allows us to obtain an (approximate) analytical expression for \( E [MC (\theta) \mid \theta > \theta'] \) in the simulated series when \( \theta' \) is large. This limits the need to construct numerical approximations to expectation terms based on probabilities in the upper tails of the type distribution.

\textsuperscript{51}More specifically, it is impossible for a density estimated using normal kernels on a finite quantity of data ever to have an exponential upper tail, since the tails are given by weighted sums of normal density functions.

52